KOSYGIN IN PARIS ALEXANDER WERTH

THE NATION

DECEMBER 26, 1966 *35 cents*

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LETTERS

anger in Australia

Mt. Pleasant, Western Australia

DEAR SIRS: I would like the people of the United States to know how resentful many Australians were over President Johnson's visit. We were due to have a nation-wide election in just four weeks' time, and considered your President's coming here a blatant and unscrupulous attempt to influence public opinion in favor of returning to office the Holt government. Most of your readers will be aware of the subservience to Washington of Mr. Holt and his ministers, a subservience which has caused them to send Australian youth into the illegal and immoral undeclared war in Vietnam. *J. A. Kane*

'not mad, sweet heaven'

New York City

DEAR SIRS: Is Johnson mad? We all know his faults, but is he also mad? He is a bully, more so when frustrated, but is he also mad? As his war continues, as his pride is being wrestled with, as his respect is being withheld . . . will his actions become mad? Whose other fingers are on the button besides those of one who may become mad? What arrangements have been made to prevent bells from ringing when he who may be mad presses the button? Is our whole world in thrall to Lear? . . .

Philip Siekevitz

Spanish aid

DEAR SIRS: Salvador de Madariaga, who shares with Pablo Casals the honorary chairmanship of Spanish Refugee Aid, is now 80 years old. He is a great humanitarian and fighter for freedom, a scholar and diplomat whose voice and pen have long been used in the service of intellectual truth and political democracy throughout the world. In his honor, Spanish Refugee Aid has established a scholarship fund for the benefit of the children of Spanish Republican exiles.

In the past few years we have given help to an increasing number of students. The fathers of many of these students are dead or else ill and handicapped by years of war and exile. These small scholarships, ranging from $150 to $350, cover the cost of books, lunches, carfare and clothing. Through the Salvador de Madariaga Fund we hope to raise $10,000. I hope your readers will join me in honoring this good man in a meaningful way by contributing what they can to this fund.

Hannah Arendt, Chairman
Spanish Refugee Aid
80 East 11 Street
New York, N. Y. 10003

Eleanor Roosevelt

DEAR SIRS: For a book on Eleanor Roosevelt, I would appreciate unpublished stories or anecdotes from anyone whose life she touched. *Stella K. Hershan*
67-66 108th St., Forest Hills, N.Y.

correction

Berkeley, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: Miss Patricia Blake, one of the editors of *Antiworlds*, points out an unfortunate error in my review ["Yevtushenko and the Underground Poets," *The Nation*, Nov. 21]. I mentioned Robert Lowell as one of the translators who contributed to *Antiworlds*. In fact, no translations by him appear in that volume, and I am sincerely sorry about the mistake. *Simon Karlinsky*

EDITORIALS

A Dirty Business

The current controversy over wire tapping, in which FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover is pitted against Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, is somewhat like the fights between wild animals which the late Frank Buck used to stage for the movies. Both animals ended up dead, which is what the movie company figured the public wanted. The outcome will not be lethal in the current rhubarb, but that either man can come out unscathed is next to impossible. On the face of it, Hoover has more to lose. He has built himself up as the superman of crime busting, the paragon who stands between the American people and its enemies, foreign and domestic. The image is now likely to be tarnished, and as the two redoubtable in-fighters have at each other, the public may get a valuable education in practical politics.

Hoover's vulnerability stems from the recent history of wire tapping and bugging. The activities of the FBI in these fields are notorious. No one but Hoover could have survived such revelations as the 1961 bugging of Joseph Schipani, which resulted in a reversal of a conviction for income tax evasion; the cases of the Las Vegas gamblers, in which the federal government was arrayed against the state of Nevada; the tapping of the Dominican Embassy's telephone lines (but it is only fair to point out that this was done with the sanction of three Presidents: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson); and the current Fred B. Black and Bobby Baker instances. (See "Snoopers and Tappers: Law-Enforcement Underground" by Fred J. Cook, *The Nation*, December 20, 1965.) Whatever Hoover's men may have learned in their electronic forays, the number of cases, past and pending, in which the prosecution's efforts have been nullified by tainted evidence is the most impressive feature of their work.

Hoover, under fire, is not one to cower behind a personal Maginot Line. He comes out shooting, and Robert Kennedy is his target. Hoover's letter to Rep. H. R. Gross of Iowa, accusing Kennedy of being fully aware of the FBI's illicit activities while he was Attorney General, has all the earmarks of a carefully rehearsed offensive. Not only Kennedy but practically all the Attorneys General of recent decades have let themselves in for this kind of attack, whenever Hoover chose to launch it. Everyone who knows Washington at all knows that Hoover has been his own boss, only nominally under the jurisdiction of the incumbent Attorney General. On the basis of the table of organization, these officials were responsible for Hoover's actions, but one and all took good care not to cross him or to know too much about what he was doing. Only the President was Hoover's superior—and not much superior at that.

Like his predecessors, Robert Kennedy did not press for information in the area of bugging and wire tapping. The revelations of William G. Hundley, chief of the Justice Department's organized crime section under Kennedy, say, in effect, that he didn't tell Kennedy what was going on because he wanted to spare Kennedy possible embarrassment. For his part, Hoover went his imperious way, patron-

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izing the Attorney General of the moment and taking precautions against having to take the rap himself if things ever went wrong.

Things have gone so wrong now that a showdown cannot be avoided. President Johnson is very much involved in the current complications, but he is in the happy position of being, in theory, above the battle. Hoover and LBJ are old friends. LBJ and Bobby Baker are not friends now, but they used to be. LBJ and Bobby Kennedy are not friends now, and never were. Hoover is surely aware that blaming the wire taps on Robert Kennedy cannot but please the President. By the same stroke, disclosures which might be embarrassing to the President—were Baker tried on the larceny, tax evasion and conspiracy charges under which he has been indicted—have probably been foreclosed by the FBI's eavesdropping on Fred Black, Baker's associate. As far as the President is concerned, things could scarcely have worked out to better advantage.

As far as the public is concerned, the one bright spot in the picture is Sen. Edward V. Long's announcement that he means to get to the bottom of the whole wiretapping and bugging machinery and the federal government's role in what that quaint, old-fashioned liberal, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, called "a dirty business."

South West Africa

On October 28, 1966, the General Assembly voted by a striking 114 to 2 (South Africa, Portugal) to end the authority of South Africa to administer the mandated territory of South West Africa. The Assembly also set up a Committee of Fourteen (including the U.S. and the USSR) to recommend no later than April, 1967, "practical means" by which to carry out the intention of the resolution to have the United Nations itself assume administrative authority. Not even the most optimistic legalist supposes that South Africa will comply with the decisions; not even the most militant African nationalist believes that the United Nations is prepared at this stage to use force.

What, then, does the resolution purport to do? Is it only some weird game of verbal symbols? Such questions cannot be answered in any very assured way. However, the resolution clearly represents African aspirations rather than states their realistic expectations. It is a part of the long process of mobilizing the international community to support the new nations' insistent demands that the situation in the southern African countries of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa be changed—through military force if necessary.

The United States needs to come to terms with the choice that must be made. Up to now, we have denounced the South Africans for their racial policies, but avoided giving support to any move toward sanctions. What is more troublesome, the United States has taken no steps to prevent or even discourage American trade and investment with prosperous South Africa. In fact, over the last decade many large United States concerns have made heavy investments in South Africa. A conflict of interest is thus being allowed to grow more severe as the verbal demands of the world community grow more insistent.

The inability to do anything effective about South

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Africa's policies in South West Africa has led the African states to frustration and anger. South West Africa is not a sovereign state, or even a colony that can claim domestic jurisdiction; it is a territory that enjoys the status of an international mandate. That is, it enjoys an international status the essence of which is that the welfare of its inhabitants is a matter of direct responsibility for the organized international community. And yet this mandated territory with its 80 per cent black population is being administered as a colony in accordance with the crude racist policies of South Africa.

African anger was whipped to fury by the decision of the World Court on July 18 that Ethiopia and Liberia were without legal standing to complain about the conditions prevailing in South West Africa. The vote was 8 to 7, and the majority was white, Eurocentric, and quite "colonialist" in spirit. The Africans felt betrayed once again.

The resolution is the direct aftermath of their anger. It may be an unwise step. South Africa may use the resolution as a pretext for annexing South West Africa, and thereby harden their commitment to maintain control. Furthermore, the General Assembly may have undermined its own ability to obtain judicial relief in the future. The World Court has been made more liberal by the recent election of five new judges; it would be likely to decide a future case differently than it did in 1966. But if the General Assembly now has authority to control the mandate, there is no proper defendant any longer; and if the Assembly lacks the authority there is no organ of the international community on behalf of whom the mandate might be upheld. Perhaps this is only a logical difficulty. In any event, South Africa would be foolish to submit to a second judicial test unless purely as a dilatory tactic; and whatever else, South Africa is not foolish.

The future of South West Africa is clouded by uncertainty. There is no prospect of an internal uprising. The pass system, the widespread use of native informers, and the cruelty of the oppressive regime make it difficult to organize an insurgent or liberation movement. As there is also no prospect of a community intervention under the auspices of the United Nations, it does not appear likely that the inhabitants of South West Africa will be in a position to throw off the shackles of South African rulership for years to come. The Resolution is an appeal to conscience, which Ambassador Goldberg found eloquent words to support. It remains to be seen whether deeds will follow.

No News

Madison Square Garden in New York seats just under 18,000, and by eight o'clock on the evening of Thursday, December 8, late-comers were scouring the balcony and main floor in search of single seats. SANE had sold out the house for a pre-Christmas peace rally dedicated to ending the pointless and heartless killing in Vietnam. There were a number of speakers—some of them men whose names are instantly recognized all over the Western world: Gunnar Myrdal, who had flown from Sweden to attend the meeting, I. F. Stone, Norman Thomas. Pete Seeger sang; Ossie Davis took the microphone and coaxed a collection out of the crowd.

Next morning, some copies of the late edition of *The New York Times* carried a 2-inch notice of this occasion on page 32. To people who phoned in protest, the *Times* explained: "Nothing new was said." Well, perhaps not. It is difficult to find new ways to describe what the United States is doing in Southeast Asia, impossible to find new ways to appeal to the reason of President Johnson and his adherents, almost futile to call upon their honor and humanity. There was no news in Dr. Myrdal's meticulous recitation, nation by nation, of America's utter friendlessness in the world today, and the *Times* probably knew (though to the audience it came as a small extra shock) that Sweden has placed the United States on a list of irresponsible countries to which it will sell no implements of war. Pete Seeger led the whole house in the singing of *Peat Bog Soldiers*, and you could feel a wave of shame and sorrow sweep the huge space—but that is not precisely news.

However, when close to 18,000 New Yorkers gather on a midweek evening to let it be known that they are sickened and driven to despair by the horrors committed in their name, it would seem that a "newspaper of record" should take due notice of the fact. Or do the editors of *The New York Times* think it a common practice for Americans to gather in a great assembly and cry out that their country is wading deep in abomination?

Only in Georgia

If the nation should follow the example of Georgia (which God forbid), elections could become a primary source of litigation, exceeding even automobile liability cases. The confusion attending the Georgia gubernatorial election has been duplicated, even more improbably, in Gainesville, the city in the northern tier of the state which bills itself as the "broiler" capital of the Southland. This poultry town held an election for mayor and one member of the city commission.

Excitement was scarcely at fever heat. Gainesville boasts a population of about 25,000 (that must be greater Gainesville, for reference works give it only about 16,500) and the total vote was 1,348. Worse ratios have been known in other strongholds of democracy, but the striking feature of this election is that the two candidates for city commissioner finished in a dead heat—674 votes each. Howard James, an insurance executive, and Joseph Stargel, office manager for a construction firm, were both willing, able and eager to serve the town, but neither could claim he had been elected. A recount was ordered, then another. There was no getting around it: 674 votes had been cast for James, 674 for Stargel—and there is no provision in the city charter for a run-off election.

What is Gainesville to do? Go to the Supreme Court of the United States, as the state of Georgia had to do in the Maddox-Callaway trouble, or toss a coin, or what? Deciding by lot would probably be illegal, and might subject the city fathers to severe penalties.

As the story got on the press wires, some joker had put the name of Batman on a write-in ballot, and the city attorney suggested that Batman be asked to choose

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between the Messrs. James and Stargel. Reverting to a more lawyerlike attitude, the attorney confessed he didn't know what to do, nor had he found anyone who could advise him.

But what about the mayoralty? This turns out to be the only happy part of the election. Mayor John Cromartie, president of the Georgia League of Municipalities and an executive in the broiler industry, was unopposed. However, he was in Las Vegas attending a convention, and could give no help in resolving the deadlock.

The High Cost of Imprisonment

When a person is sent to jail, it is not only he—and his family—that suffers. The taxpayers are punished as well as the prisoner, and this is only one aspect of a generally botched penal situation.

The problem of "crime" involves much more than law enforcement, about which currently there is much talk. The other side of the problem—what to do with those offenders you succeed in arresting and convicting—normally gets less attention. Fortunately, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, whose overall report is due for release in January, has taken a broad view of its assignment. Its task forces have been working in five divisions: assessment of the crime problem, police and public safety, administration of criminal justice, corrections, and effects of science and technology.

Pending the presentation of the complete study, the President's Commission has released a report prepared for it by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. The economic aspect alone is disquieting. State and local governments (exclusive of the extensive federal system of penitentiaries and law-enforcement agencies) are spending about $1 billion a year just to keep convicts locked up—and less than $200 million in efforts to rehabilitate them. Dr. Elmer K. Nelson, a University of Southern California professor who heads the corrections task force, remarked that this portion of the report surprised him by revealing "how heavily committed we are to just holding onto people." It is almost as if the criminal population were a precious component of society—giving employment, a sense of superiority, and other benefits of a sort to the respectable elements.

Contrary to the general impression that we "coddle" offenders, the fact is that we rely much more on imprisonment than do other Western countries. We impose, in general, longer sentences, both for major and petty crimes. We "overuse imprisonment" in the attempt to rid ourselves of the expense and danger of confirmed criminality, and the results are costly and inefficient. Although much of the pioneer work in probation was done in the United States, the Council's studies indicate that it is not used nearly enough, and that we are underemploying suspended sentences, fines in lieu of imprisonment and similar measures. The evidence shows that such devices can be used without danger to the public—notably so when probation departments are adequately staffed with well-trained personnel. Probationers do as well as, or better than, released prisoners. The effects of imprisonment tend to be harmful rather than corrective. (See article p. 701 for a striking example.)

On an average day some 1,220,000 persons are under the care or supervision of state and local agencies. Included are some 141,000 in city and local jails, usually for terms of less than a year. Of these, between 60,000 and 70,000 are chronic alcoholics, many of whom no doubt are in jail for custodial care rather than serious misdemeanor. More than 2,550,000 persons move through the prison system each year. One reason for this multiplier effect is that 90 per cent of all persons working in state and local correctional institutions are administrators and guards, while less than 10 per cent are engaged in treatment, academic or vocational work. Adequate guidance and supervision for parolees and probationers are said to be "sadly lacking." The only conclusion one can draw from what has been released in advance of the definitive reports is that American penology as a whole is in need of a major overhaul.

KOSYGIN IN PARIS

DIFFERENCES WITHIN AMITY

ALEXANDER WERTH

Paris

It would be an exaggeration to say that Premier Kosygin aroused in France as much interest and enthusiasm as General de Gaulle did in the Soviet Union last summer. When I was in Russia in July, a month after his visit, people still talked about the "tremendous reception" he had been given everywhere. To the Russians de Gaulle was a symbol of all that France stood for; he was the man who had cocked a snook at the United States and had cleared out of NATO—the man who, alone among Western leaders, had openly condemned the war in Vietnam.

Mr. Kosygin, by comparison, was colorless, an *haut fonctionnaire,* as it were, not very different from Mr. Gromyko or dozens of other more or less poker-faced Soviet top diplomats and functionaries. True, although he is only head of the government and not head of state, he received head-of-state treatment, de Gaulle driving to Orly airport to welcome him. But to those remembering the 1960 visit of the ebullient Mr. Khrushchev (who could always be expected to say something unexpected, and even outrageous), Mr. Kosygin's performance was a bit disappointing. However, as we shall see, he did once or twice depart from his habit of saying merely the "correct" thing.

Though practically the last (and youngest) active survivor

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

of Stalin's Politburo (the other survivors, like Shevernik, Voroshilov and Mikoyan, are very old; or, like Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Khrushchev, have been pensioned off and ordered to keep quiet), Kosygin was never a Stalinite in the real sense. Under Stalin, he was never more than a competent technician who dealt with a variety of economic problems, such as the evacuation of industries to the East during the war and their reorganization once the war was over. Oddly enough, after Stalin's death, he suffered a temporary setback; though remaining a minister, he was removed from the Politburo, and was not re-elected until 1960. His relations with Khrushchev appear to have been rather strained; he condemned the Cuban venture, was more than critical of Khrushchev's management of Soviet agriculture, and deplored his failure to do anything about the first American bombings of North Vietnam. He disliked Khrushchev's garrulousness during trips abroad, and such demonstrations as shoe-banging at the UN.

Kosygin is clearly more than a mere technician today; he is a man with a "world policy," even if that policy has little to do with ideology. Unlike Khrushchev, he did not write off the Chinese as utterly hopeless; he attempted, in February, 1965, to resume some kind of cooperation with Mao Tse-tung; and if he failed in this, he at least made it clear that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the war in Vietnam. Since then, he has steadily insisted that if Vietnam could not be given more effective help, it was because the Chinese were preventing the constitution of a vast Socialist bloc whose sheer weight would force a different policy on the United States. But that Russia—independently of the Chinese—was still a great political force in Asia Kosygin effectively demonstrated when he brought about the India-Pakistan settlement at Tashkent.

There is nothing Kosygin would like better than "peaceful coexistence" with the United States (he said so again in Paris), but that is impossible as long as the war in Vietnam continues. There is, on the other hand, no doubt that he believes firmly in closer bonds with Western Europe, especially economic bonds, and he includes Britain in Western Europe. His regard for France is realistic, rather than sentimental. De Gaulle represents for him a certain "neutralist" current which is not altogether alien; Russia has had, at times, its own "neutralist" undertones. Although he does not, perhaps, take literally de Gaulle's concept of an "Atlantic to the Urals" Europe, Kosygin sees in it certain long-range possibilities for a much closer economic cooperation between East and West, for a gradual disappearance of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and, most important in the long run, for a definitive "European" settlement of the German problem. That this problem has become more urgent than it seemed even a year ago may be seen from Kosygin's pointed references to the ominous revival of a Nazi party in Western Germany. Kosygin and de Gaulle do not see eye to eye on every aspect of the German problem. The Russians are eager that the Western powers should recognize the accomplished fact of the "two Germanys" and give *de facto*, if not *de jure*, recognition to the East German Republic which (Kosygin remarked) demonstrates, today more than ever, the advantage of having at least one part of Germany free of Nazi influence. De Gaulle, on the other hand, while recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier, sticks to the principle of self-determination and continues to taunt the Russians with having created an "artificial satellite" in East Germany. He believes that Germany should be united, and form part of a unified Europe that is to be free, as far as possible, of any military blocs, and with "ideological frontiers" reduced to next to nothing. All this, of course, implies that the united Germany should live within the territorial *status quo*, and certain precautions would be taken by all concerned against a new German aggression. Russia, and Britain for that matter, could see no objection to this; the Nazi revival, as Kosygin remarked, must have reminded the English of the London blitz!

There is no fundamental disagreement between France and Russia on the principle of the nonproliferation of atomic weapons, but whereas the Russians would like a definite, signed international treaty, de Gaulle, as a newcomer in the nuclear club, still seems to have certain inhibitions about the dotted line. As *Le Monde* remarked: "France's opposition to proliferation goes without saying, but the Russians would still prefer her to say it." On the subject of that great conference on European security which the Russians would like to call, Kosygin merely declared that it would be for the members of this conference to agree on the agenda; also, it was for them, he said, to decide to what extent and in what form they should try to secure American participation in the talks and an American guarantee for the "European security settlement" that might result.

So Kosygin's visit to France has not produced anything world shaking; plenty of good will, but no agreement, so far, on nonproliferation, or on Germany, while the European Security Conference, though originally de Gaulle's brain child, is still left suspended in mid-air, subject no doubt to a great number of bilateral preparatory talks. Kosygin differed more sharply with de Gaulle on Germany than on nonproliferation ("a solution," he said, "will ultimately be found to this"—obviously with American support); he said flatly that the West Germans (and everybody else, for that matter) should "realistically" accept the existence of two Germanys; "no outside force can change this situation, either now or later."

At the lunch given him by the diplomatic press, Kosygin

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was asked awkward questions, but unlike Khrushchev who would certainly have flown off the handle, he remained courteous and wholly unruffled. Trotsky? No, there would be no rehabilitation of Trotsky, since Trotskyism had done the Soviet Union the greatest harm. "Why are no French newspapers other than the Communist *Humanité* read in Russia?" Here Kosygin quibbled: "Our people prefer to read *Humanité* but, of course, there might be other papers they'd like to read, too; but that depends on you, gentlemen of the press." This was pretty clumsy, considering that in Warsaw *Le Monde* and many other French papers are available on the bookstalls.

However, Kosygin did not dodge another question that was also obviously meant to embarrass him. An American correspondent referred to the fact that "many Jewish families had been separated by the war; some members were in the Soviet Union, others abroad; could they ever meet, as Greek and Armenian families in the same position had met?" The question was put cautiously, and seemed to refer to possible reciprocal visits by members of the same family; Kosygin took the whole problem in its broader aspects. While making the usual denial that the Soviet Union practiced anti-Semitism, or any kind of discrimination against Jews, he made the rather startling statement that not only was there no objection to members of the same family meeting one another, but also "for those who wanted to leave the Soviet Union the door was open, and there was no problem whatsoever."

In *Russia Under Khrushchev,* a book I published a few years ago, I had a chapter on "The Two Jewish Problems in Russia." I showed that there was a minority of old-fashioned, orthodox or Israel-conscious Jews who resented the Soviet measures taken against their specifically Jewish or Yiddish culture, which the Soviets considered archaic, bourgeois-nationalist and denoting "split loyalties" (to put it mildly). On the other hand, a much larger group of Jews objected to the obstacles placed in the way of their complete assimilation with the Russians or Ukrainians, to the fact that even if they changed their name to a Russian name, they still were called "Jews" on their passports and were subjected, in certain cases, to prejudice, if not outright discrimination.

The question that really arises, after Kosygin's statement, is whether the Soviets will welcome the departure of the "unassimilated" Jewish minority of perhaps not more than 500,000 people, and whether, as against this, they will authorize the complete assimilation of those approximately 2 million Jews who do not, in the main, want to rank as Jews, and many of whom hold highly responsible positions in practically all fields of activity—industry, science, journalism and theatre, the cinema, music, etc.

Kosygin was also asked questions on Vietnam and China. On the former he said he could do nothing but respect the conditions for a cease-fire laid down by Hanoi and the Vietcong; as for China, he merely referred his questioners to the article published in *Pravda* on November 27.

I read this very long article carefully and, oddly enough, it reminded me of something I had read in the Soviet press eighteen years ago: Mao Tse-tung was being treated much as Tito had been treated in those days. In one respect the resemblance was particularly marked. Just as the Russians had asserted that there were, in 1948, many good Marxist-Leninist Yugoslavs who were loyal to the Soviet Union and were being persecuted (and even murdered) by Tito, so now there were said to be Chinese Communists who agreed with Moscow and wholly disapproved of Mao's "anti-Leninist" line.

All the fury of the "cultural revolution"—Mao's creation—was really directed not against American imperialism but against the Soviet Union. By branding "revisionist" the Soviet Communist Party and practically all other Communist parties, Mao had isolated China. The *Pravda* article clearly suggested that the Stalin "personality cult" was child's play when compared with the cult of Mao, who "placed himself above Marx, Engels and Lenin." Moreover, this Maoism was not merely an internal matter, since the "cultural revolution" had strong international pretensions. Without recalling that the Russians stopped their economic help to China as long ago as 1960, *Pravda* taxed the Chinese with black ingratitude.

Much is made in *Pravda* of the "Leninist cadres" of the Chinese Communist party who (like Zujovic and Hebrang in Yugoslavia) are now being persecuted; the Red Guards (whom *Pravda* curiously calls "the Red Okhrana") are supported by the police and the army; the purpose of the cultural revolution is to complete the divorce between China and Russia and, if possible, to bring about a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. *Pravda* even talks about "collusion" between China and the United States. It also draws attention to the violent anti-Soviet broadcasts in Russian that are sent out by a dozen hard-working Chinese wireless stations. Despite Chinese claims to the contrary, the Russian paper asserts that Mao has no following outside his own country (a point virtually conceded by the Albanians, recently, with their boast that "Mao is not afraid of being isolated").

But the paper's main argument, of course, is that China is disrupting the international Communist movement, is thus hampering truly decisive help to Vietnam, and is chauvinist and anti-Russian.

Even more interesting than this *Pravda* attack on Maoism is the account given in *Izvestia* for November 22 of a visit made to China by a Russian delegation from the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. The trip had to be cut short because everywhere they went the Russians



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were insulted as "revisionists" and likened even to the Nazis! When the visitors talked of improved living standards in Russia, the Chinese cried "bourgeois degeneration"; one Chinese factory director said to them: "Piecework is substantially selfish and is the essence of revisionism." And one of the Russian delegates commented: "The odd thing is that, having got rid of their capitalists and landlords, *the Chinese seem to be glorying in poverty which they seem to want to perpetuate! What a caricature of Marxism!*"

The delegates were astonished when they went to a concert at a workers' club. The girls' choir sang quotations from Mao Tse-tung, and followed this exercise with a dance performed to the accompaniment of additional extracts from Mao's works. Their "most painful moment," one delegate reported, was when they visited a children's home. Here a toddler of 3, on being told that they were Soviet comrades, said (insofar as he had learned to speak at all): "Soviet revisionists, bad people." Then these young citizens broke into a chant about imperialism, Soviet revisionism, etc. A delegate asked the teacher if they ever sang about chickens and rabbits: "No, songs about Mao, and political slogans were more important." What makes all such stories so striking is not that they prove the political or even ideological differences between the Russians and the Chinese but that they show a profound psychological incomprehension between the two peoples. That was the point made to me by many Russians during my last visit to Moscow: "We seem to have a common language with West Europeans, even with Americans; with the Chinese we have no common language, no mutual understanding. And that is much more tragic, in the long run, than any political disagreements."

What then of the Chinese "Zujovics and Hebrangs"—those pro-Soviet Chinese Communists—to whom *Pravda* refers? Are they a real political force in China, or are they, like the pro-Stalin Yugoslavs of 1948, mere rare exceptions who cannot in any way alter the course of history? The impression one gets is that Russians are at least as puzzled by what is really going on in China as we are.

The Russians, now relatively rich (thanks largely to major changes in agricultural policy since Khrushchev; they have had a bumper harvest this year) find Chinese egalitarianism and the austere cult of poverty particularly baffling—and embarrassing. It is scarcely surprising that Kosygin should have preferred not to discuss all this in front of bourgeois audiences in France. Would he not also have had to say that if the Chinese were at present impotent in their world-revolution ambitions, the Russians were really not interested in world revolution at all, for all their talk about "proletarian internationalism"?

Not that Kosygin was (as has been suggested by some papers) standoffish or unfriendly to the French Communists. He had a "fraternal" meeting with their leaders during his "pilgrimage" to the small flat where Lenin once lived, but during his visit to aircraft factories (at one he saw the still uncompleted Concorde), he merely smiled and waved at the workers, and spent all his time talking to the French directors and top technicians. The fact, an irony of international relations, is that while the French Communists want the Gaullists defeated in the March general election, Kosygin would much prefer de Gaulle and the Gaullists to continue their rule of France. This great display of Franco-Soviet friendship (Pompidou is shortly going to Moscow) is not entirely unrelated to the French election; de Gaulle hopes to get for his supporters quite a number of Communist working-class votes.

PROFITS OF WAR

THE PUTSCH AGAINST McNAMARA

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Little noticed during the Vietnamese escalation has been the quiet coup of defense and air-space contractors against the reform efforts of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The main salient of the coup came in mid-1965 with the muzzling of the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congress' own "Inspector General." Now a new curtain of secrecy has fallen.

However controversial his foreign policy role, McNamara's conduct of the Department of Defense (DOD) has won admiration among all except those who have been beneficiaries of the system of power and special privilege built up by two decades of cold war and permanent crisis. From the start, he set about the difficult task of finding new contract yardsticks. He applied a program of cost/effectiveness analysis to all budget requests and placed future budgeting on a five-year "program-package" basis. To correct the military propensity for rushing into large-scale contracts on the basis of inadequate information, he adopted a step-method of moving from program definition and feasibility studies through gradually larger research and development (R&D) and hardware contracts, attempting to weed out duplication and unpromising efforts at as early and inexpensive a stage as possible. McNamara played an important role in formulating the Administration's new code of ethical practices and the recommendations of the 1962 Bell Report (on administration of R&D contracts), forcefully implementing these in the DOD. In 1962, he announced "Project 60," which aimed at consolidating DOD's control of all defense procurement, eliminating the unruly, fragmented and refractory decentralization which had resulted in service duplication, competition and evasion of DOD authority.

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McNamara's efforts were initiated in the first months of the Kennedy administration and reached heights of success and promise just before the Vietnamese escalation. In early 1965, President Johnson extended the "method" to the entire Administration, ordering all agencies to be operating on the new system by fiscal 1967. It seemed that the main battles had been won and that, despite huge war spending in Vietnam, the gang of contractors, grown fat and sassy at taxpayer expense, would now be in for leaner days. Backed by a team of tough and knowing scientific managers and managing scientists, McNamara had by 1965 humbled the Air Force, unified procurement, and initiated administrative controls which, for the first time, made possible top-level discipline of the sprawling contractor-military empires.

However, the forces of the "Contract State" did not become loyal soldiers in the President's war against waste. Rather, they demonstrated determination, durability and undiminished political and economic power. The very reforms were subtly converted to enhance the system, utilizing every loophole, the inertial resistance of the lower bureaucratic echelons, the intervention of influential Congressional committees and the President's need to win support for new welfare programs and Vietnamese policy.

The McNamara regime has used the General Accounting Office as a real management tool, matching the GAO itself in enthusiasm for efficiency and economy. As a result, a great majority of legislators have manifested growing annoyance and disillusionment with the GAO. Where Congress had previously used GAO charges primarily as a lever for political bargaining with the Administration, they now faced the prospect of genuine action to eliminate waste.

The spokesmen of the contractor community have made clear that their real concern is with the impact of the McNamara reforms, aided and abetted by GAO audits. Boeing's Howard W. Neffner declared:

> As a result of its expanding role within government, GAO has become intimately involved in the daily activities of many government agencies. In the exercise of its more recently acquired right to audit contractors, GAO is attempting a similarly deep penetration of industry. The promising nature of GAO criticism, and the efforts made to enforce its recommendations are already dominant factors in procurement policy and practise.

H. M. Horner, chairman of United Aircraft, stated: "Increased Congressional guidance of GAO is needed to make sure that that agency does not, through its wide powers, seek to impose unwise policies on the executive agencies, which may lead, among other things, to increased defense procurement costs and to undermining the integrity of government contracts." Contractors went so far as to promote a passive resistance campaign against the GAO, closing their doors and their books to the auditors of the comptroller general.

Department of Defense reforms based upon GAO reports were seen by contractors as representing a philosophy fundamentally subversive to "free enterprise": They constituted, in the words of Lockheed's president, "a contrary philosophy that contractors whose business is primarily with the government are, in reality, agents of the government rather than private businesses. . . ." A trade association officer declared that, in the comptroller general's view, defense industry was "analogous to a regulated industry and hence profits on negotiated defense contracts are to be limited in somewhat the same fashion as utility company profits are limited by regulatory commissions."

In a 1965 inquiry into GAO practices, members of the Holifield subcommittee (House Government Operations Committee) behaved like prosecuting attorneys toward GAO officials: Instead of Lockheed, GAO was investigated. While vigorously and scathingly inquiring into federal grants and contracts to universities, Congressmen tend to treat government contractors with deference, sympathy and an elaborate ritual of manners.

In the middle of that investigation, Comptroller General Joseph Campbell resigned "for reasons of health." He had been a valiant comptroller for almost ten years, pursuing the tough auditing practices which enabled Congressmen to pose as defenders of the nation's purse, an attitude that often served the public interest. In 1965, however, the forthright style of GAO reports was not appreciated, and the cross fire Campbell faced certainly made it plausible that his heart condition prevented him from defending his honor and his agency in that hostile atmosphere.

His departure permitted legislators to select a comptroller general more understanding of the new mood of Congress. The choice fell on Elmer Staats (he assumed the post in March, 1966) who, as deputy budget director during the Eisenhower years, had cultivated close and effective liaison with Democratic legislators and was widely considered one of their key men in the Republican administration.

During the year which intervened between the subcommittee's investigation and the report to the House, dickering over guidelines went on quietly and with perfect effect. The report describes and justifies the new guidelines. The key revisions (as stated by Acting Comptroller General Frank H. Weitzel):

Deletion of names and specifics. Specific "deficiencies" of contractors and contracting agencies would no longer be reflected in public GAO documents. The agency was "modifying our practices to provide that the titles of our reports to the Congress be couched in constructive terms rather than in the terms of the deficiencies being reported." Detailed comments would be couched "in as constructive a vein as possible." Emphasis would be shifted from specific instances of fraud, wrongdoing and mismanagement to "the corrective measures needed." Reports would focus on "basic causes of adverse conditions." Individual examples of waste or inefficiency ". . . will serve as indications of, and will be used in our reports as illustrations of, the need for management improvements rather than necessarily the subjects of individual reports to the Congress." The agency has "discontinued the practise of (1) disclosing in our reports the identities of individuals immediately responsible for actions or operations we are criticizing and (2) including in our reports recommendation for disciplinary or other personnel action."

Such information "when warranted or requested" would be conveyed to "appropriate agency officials and to inter-

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ested Congressional committees or members by separate letters."

Recovery left to others. Weitzel noted that in audits of cost-type contracts, GAO had often taken the position that a prime contractor had failed to exercise "due care" in protecting the government's interest, "and we therefore recommended a recovery on the basis of common-law right." This was in accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulations which recognized "due care" as a criterion for determining reasonable and therefore allowable costs. The procedure would now be dropped, and instead GAO would recognize that "the authority for determining the reasonableness of costs rests with the contracting agency." In the future, recommendations for recovery of excess costs would be submitted to the contracting agency "for consideration as a matter under the contract rather than on the basis of common-law right. . . ."

Referred cases to be secret. Discovery of outright fraud or other law violation would continue to be referred to the Justice Department, but in camera. "In view of the possible adverse effects that such public disclosure might have on the individuals or company involved, we have decided that such referrals, when made, would not be mentioned in our reports to the Congress." During the period from 1958 to 1964, forty-one such instances, involving most of the contractor giants, have been reported and referred to Justice. More than half of these have resulted in "voluntary refunds," an admission of guilt and a token expiation. Only a handful of cases have gone to court, there to be feebly prosecuted and usually lost; the balance have been pigeonholed on the grounds of insufficient evidence or reluctance of the agency concerned to press the case.

"Good Conscience and Equity" recoveries. Noting that "The Truth in Negotiation Act" provides that contractors certify cost estimates and that all negotiated cost-type contracts contain a clause for adjustment of increases "resulting from inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current data," the GAO would hereafter refrain from seeking voluntary refunds on contracts entered into prior to the law's effective date (December 1, 1962) "except in unusual instances." In citing this policy, the GAO smuggled in a sharp indictment of contracting practices:

> We have observed and reported many cases of excessive prices resulting from unrealistically high cost estimates submitted by the prospective contractor for negotiation purposes. . . . Often it was our view that the prices proposed were unrealistically high considering the information available at the time as to the probable cost of production. Sometimes the available data indicated a cost substantially below that included in the composition of the price proposed. . . . At other times the contractor refused to furnish cost information, but the proposed price greatly exceeded the anticipated cost plus the rate of profit normally allowed. . . . In those cases . . . we recommended that the agency seek an adjustment . . . on the basis of good conscience and equity even though there was no legal liability. . . .

Release of reports to the press. GAO audits have protected the public interest primarily through publicity resulting from direct release of reports to the press. "We have been concerned with a few complaints from contractors that they first become aware through news media of the issuance of final reports on contracts with them." To avoid this embarrassment, the agency would "insure delivery of the reports to Congress, the agencies, and contractors concerned before distribution to others. . . ." The contractor's position would ordinarily be made a part of the report, although he might not be identified therein.

The agency would also demonstrate more respect for contractor demands that reports omit information which might disclose "trade secrets and other proprietary business information."

Withheld payments. During the inquiry, three cases had developed in which GAO audits revealed such gross irregularities that the agency in question was compelled to order withholding of payments to the contractors. The committee report noted that "after these issues were reviewed and discussed at the hearings," the matter had been reconsidered and "the Comptroller General decided that further withholding of payments would not be necessary in the three cases. . . ."

Finally, the GAO declared that it would review the organization and function of the new Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) of the Department of Defense in order to "avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. . . ." This innocent statement conceals a device which Congressional leaders show signs of using to undermine completely the authority of GAO to demand access to contractor's records, books and pricing data in cost-plus contracts.

Judging by the report, the Holifield committee has succeeded in convincing GAO that "a large part of the responsibilities for policing the Truth in Negotiation Act necessarily falls to the Defense Contract Audit Agency." However, while the law gives GAO this power, it has not given DCAA a similar right. The report notes that "if the Department of Defense is to acquire the access privilege on a sustained or permanent basis, it probably should be a matter of Congressional rather than administrative decision." Having seriously undermined GAO's will to use this power, the Congress has made no move to empower the DCAA to assume this essential responsibility. In fact, the committee paused in its report to justify reluctance to act on the matter:

> While it appears at first glance that there can be no objection to granting contractual privilege of access to company books and records in public contracting, knotty questions will arise when contractors are compelled to assert this privilege against sub-contractors who are also competitors in other respects.

The muzzling of the GAO by pressure, subterfuge and gentlemen's agreement was accomplished silently and smoothly, with almost no repercussions and only token protest. I failed to find a single mention in a survey of nine of the nation's most responsible newspapers, including the reproving and respectable *New York Times.*

The Congressional spanking produced results well before the Campbell resignation and the end of the inquiry. In regard to cases referred to the Justice Department for recovery of overcharges or for criminal prosecution, the committee notes that "the backlog . . . has been reduced" and that "no new cases have been referred by the GAO to Justice." In regard to GAO's intention to refrain from recommending voluntary refunds, "even when it believes

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prices charged by the contractor were excessive," it is disclosed that "since July 1965, none of the reports issued by the GAO have recommended voluntary recoveries from contractors, except in one instance where the DOD concurred."

This "broader and more positive" approach has resulted in a precipitous drop in the number of GAO reports. For the last half of calendar year 1965, total reports were less than one-quarter the number published in the last half of 1964. In addition, fifty-seven reports were "indefinitely postponed" during the period September, 1965, through March, 1966. Twenty-nine other investigations would not be issued as final reports. Staats announced in August, 1966, the preparation of a generalized report, based upon the audits of 242 negotiated prime contracts and subcontracts, having a dollar value of more than $600 million and involving eighty-five primes and eighty-nine subs. This "constructive" analysis of a general problem would serve, he said, more effectively to aid the Congress and the public than the multiple separate and specific reports of the past.

A number of Congressmen have expressed dissent, inserting minority views in the committee report. Congressman Jack Brooks (D., Tex.) declared that

> . . . many of the recommendations contained in the report, in my opinion, will deter rather than encourage improvements in GAO audit procedures. . . . I do not subscribe to the endorsement of policies limiting access of the press and the public to information in the GAO reports, particularly with reference to the referral of matters to the Department of Justice.

He charged that the committee disclosed little discussion, cited only three examples, and gave no evaluation or classification of deficiencies in specific GAO audits. Nor, he added, "is any significant evidence of this type found in the hearings." The conclusions of the report "can only intensify the difficulties confronting the GAO in maintaining an effective contract audit system. . . ." Congressmen John W. Wydler (R., N.Y.) and Clarence J. Brown, Jr. (R., Ohio) endorsed the report but with qualification: "While we approve generally of GAO's 'self-appraisal and improvement' we do not wish to imply any endorsement of decisions in derogation of the public's right to know." Congressmen Robert Dole (R., Kan.) and Donald Rumsfeld (R., Ill.) wrote that the report "could tend to place the GAO on the defensive in its future contract audit operations." They called for the appearance of Comptroller General Staats before Congress to present his personal evaluation of the guidelines, concluding "the GAO is an arm of Congress. Let's not disarm it."

Two other Congressmen later added their voices. Rep. Richard H. Poff (R., Va.) told an aerospace journal he did not approve of any effort to "gag and sterilize" the investigative arm of Congress, especially when the party in office has such big majorities in both Executive and legislative branches. Rep. James A. Haley (D., Fla.) called for a public outcry against the Holifield committee which, he said, was trying "to diminish GAO's effectiveness and cover-up information the public has a right to know."

The real tendency of the GAO muzzling became clear in July, 1966, when the agency was forced to play a shabby role in an effort by the House Armed Services Special Investigations Subcommittee to attack and discredit the whole McNamara cost-reduction and reform program. In July, 1965, the Secretary of Defense had issued a third annual report on the cost-reduction program, claiming savings from actions during the 1964 fiscal year of $5.3 billion and predicting a rate over $6 billion by 1969.

In 1966, Rep. Porter Hardy, Jr. (D., Va.), opened an investigation of these claims and clearly demonstrated a disposition to dismiss them as either imaginary or as a factor directly compromising the combat effectiveness of U.S. troops in Vietnam. (The contradiction between these two interpretations failed to trouble him.) The hearings did not support either conclusion, since GAO representatives, set to work on McNamara's figures, found only minor discrepancies in the reported savings (some of which, indeed, turned out to have been understated). The testimony made clear that a reasonable man might quarrel with some of the standards employed to identify and define savings, but even here it was clear that top DOD leadership was striving to improve the criteria and was aware that separate services were inclined to interpret figures so as to make the most of reported savings.

The overall effect was to dramatize the difficulties which beset McNamara's attempt to impose a degree of administrative integrity over the sprawling and refractory agencies of his domain. In spite of this, the Armed Services subcommittee managed to construe every scrap of negative information in a way to support their attack, and to justify their drastic recommendations. In a prologue to its recommendations, the report sought to overcome the weakness of evidence in its case:

> The sprinkling of a few true savings actions in a pot containing many which are either invalid or questionable does not turn the mixture into pure gold. Instead, the de-

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based result could make the whole program suspect, causing it to lose its value and force as a powerful aid to real economy.

Among other things, the committee called upon McNamara to "reduce the pressures of the present quota system, to lessen the possibility of defense judgments being made on an economy basis rather than a military basis." To beef up its charges, the subcommittee implied that much of the story remained classified and that real shortages had occurred as a result of Defense management. One may search the actual testimony in vain for some general indication of the impact of the alleged classified information.

The events attending the GAO muzzling are secondary to underlying problems of public contracting which cut to the heart of the evolving nature of American society. Government functions at all levels are being put out on contract today at an unprecedented rate, and contracting for space, defense and science has become a method not merely for procuring goods and services but also for social management, the allocation of national resources, and for the pump-priming of jobs, income and the production level of the economy. Federal contracts have become a significant part of the general patchwork of subsidies (for consumer industries, transportation, education, welfare programs, etc.). Public contracting has always been a patronage tool ("honest graft") which raised difficult and sensitive conflict-of-interest and management problems. Today, the scale and scope of the system give a new urgency to these problems. What is to be done?

Claims made in behalf of "free enterprise" by defense, aerospace, science, road-building and other companies that subsist and grow entirely on public funds are specious and serve only to protect them from adequate public supervision. It is nonetheless clear that some kind of partnership between private enterprise and government is desirable and inevitable. Government responsibilities are too broad and manifold to be conducted entirely by civil servants in a vast bureaucracy. The pluralism provided by the private economy, at least in those areas where the profit motive and competition still operate, is an excellent safeguard. It constitutes a kind of outrigging for the social system which maintains its resilience through checks and balances not merely in government but also between government and all kinds of more or less independent organized interests (social, economic and political). The present system has much to recommend it and methods are available to control or rectify its dangerous tendencies.

An American ombudsman? The DOD's new Central Audit Agency can do an important part of the job which the GAO heretofore has performed alone, giving the civilian leadership of the department greater access and control over the negotiated procurements, now at $30-plus billion a year and certain to grow larger. But the new agency is neither government-wide nor independent of the Defense Department. After McNamara, its role may be drastically altered and the newly unified DOD powers distributed again among the parochial and self-serving armed services. The sole government-wide agency is the Bureau of the Budget, which has only incidental post-audit responsibilities, and of course lacks independence from the ongoing interests of the Administration. In spite of Congressional interest in GAO as a weapon of political bargaining, its indispensable role is to provide Congress and the public with information on government expenditures from a source independent of the Executive and of the agencies of the vast federal establishment.

However, the "Inspector General" function should be protected from the vicissitudes of politics and from inordinate control by any parochial agency, Congressional bloc or transitory aberration of public opinion. Theoretically, Congress represents many conflicting regions, blocs, interests and parties. However, its pluralism has been severely eroded by the unexamined institutions of the Contract State that have sprung into being with war and permanent diplomacy. The stake that almost every member has in the distribution of federal largess tends to undermine and corrupt independence and to restrict criticism to rare Congressional outsiders whose main motivation is that they and their constituents are not sharing in the loot. Thus the Inspector General requires a legal basis of independence similar to that of federal judges.

Perhaps the institution of the ombudsman, a Swedish invention, should be tried. The word translates as "a man who represents the little people." Sweden incorporated the institution in its constitution of 1809, primarily to guarantee civil rights. England adopted it in 1966 as a means of giving the people another route of representation in the growing number of government-operated industries. Michigan recently appointed an ombudsman of sorts on an experimental basis, and last June Nassau County, New York, appointed a retired judge as Commissioner of Accounts with ombudsman duties in such areas as road repair, snow removal and street lighting. The ombudsman provides the public with a servant who does not depend upon their votes for early re-election and presumably will not look toward special interests for eventual reward.

The contract-auditing function can work exactly as did the GAO at its best, prior to April, 1965. But its independence must be vouchsafed by granting the comptroller general a term at least two years longer than that of the longest elected term of federal office (that is at least eight years). The GAO staff must enjoy secure civil service status, adequate salaries, high standards and the prestige which appointment of a respected senior statesman, industrialist, labor leader or other distinguished professional to the top post might induce. Full public disclosure of all audit investigations must be guaranteed.

Such a system, however carefully designed, would be subject to corruption, and there will always be a temptation to create one more watchdog office or agency to police the last one created. This argument does not destroy the ombudsman notion. It is stupid to trust no one, just as it is puerile to assume that the ombudsman will relieve the Congress, the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Defense Secretary, the President, the leaders of both political parties, the spokesmen of organized interest and pressure groups, or any other would-be active citizens from the perennial challenges of life in a democratic society.

The need for yardsticks. It is also essential that government have within its capabilities a yardstick for contractor costs and performance. Where genuine competitive pricing and open bidding (without collusion) are practiced, the law of supply and demand provides a measure sufficient

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ing the use of sound trucks that made "loud and raucous noises," Justice Black pointed out that "public speaking" was an "instrument of communication" of equal importance with, though serving a different function than, the "press, radio or moving pictures." He went on:

> There are many people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who do not have enough money to own or control publishing plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show places. Yet everybody knows the vast reaches of these powerful channels of communication which from the very nature of our economic system must be under the control and guidance of comparatively few people. On the other hand, public speaking is done by many men of divergent minds with no centralized control over the ideas they entertain so as to limit the causes they espouse. It is no reflection on the value of preserving freedom for dissemination of the ideas of publishers of newspapers, magazines, and other literature, to believe that transmission of ideas through public speaking is also essential to the sound thinking of a fully informed citizenry.

Actually, public assemblies possess important advantages for effective expression that are not found in other forms of communication. They permit face-to-face contact between the speaker and his audience, and thereby enhance the power of the message. For the participants they invoke feelings of solidarity and mutual support. For the onlookers they evidence the intensity and dedication with which expressed views are held. For the community as a whole they may be sufficiently upsetting to force reconsideration of the issue in controversy. All in all, the public assembly has a direct impact that is achieved by no other form of communication.

It is therefore not surprising that, throughout the years, the public assembly has been an essential technique for propagating new, minority, or unconventional opinion. In England it figured prominently in political reform movements from the 17th century on, as well as in the activities of such groups as the Salvation Army and the suffragettes. In the United States, the insurgent colonists, the abolitionists, the suffragettes, and many minority political parties have relied heavily on various forms of public assembly to advance their viewpoints. Without public assembly, the labor movement could hardly have won its struggle for public acceptance and political support.

The public assembly retains its vitality. In recent times the civil rights movement has developed novel types of public demonstration, and the peace groups have found such forms of communication indispensable. So have housewives protesting high prices, and the outraged home owner battling bulldozers intent on putting the newest superhighway through his living room. It should be also remembered that many groups representing the conventional order of things, from political parties to fraternal organizations, make extensive use of public assembly.

There is no doubt that the public assembly entails some risks and some discomforts to society. The mere congregating of large numbers of people, especially in tense situations, may set the stage for violence or disorder. The face-to-face encounter of speaker and audience diminishes the likelihood of fully considered action or reaction. And public open places have many other uses, to which the public assembly has to be accommodated. But these perils must be faced, and the inconveniences endured, unless a vital aspect of free expression is to be lost.

The task of the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, is to establish the constitutional ground rules by which a vigorous and viable system of public assembly can function. At the heart of such a system is the basic right of citizens to assemble peaceably in public open places.

If such a constitutional right does not exist, then the government can cut off at will all meetings, parades, demonstrations, canvassing, picketing and similar activities that utilize outside public space. Or, if the government chooses to permit such use, it can limit the privilege in any way it sees fit, provided it does not act arbitrarily or show discrimination.

A constitutional ruling to that effect would leave the citizens with only a shadow of the right to assemble peaceably. By and large, there does not, and cannot, exist any constitutional right to meet or demonstrate on private property without the consent of the owner. There are exceptions to this rule, as in the case of company towns, and there are situations where consent may be implied, as in the sit-ins at lunch counters. But generally speaking, private facilities are foreclosed except by the grace of the owner. Nor is the right of public assembly adequately served by any right to meet in public closed places, such as town halls or school buildings. Even if a constitutional right to use such facilities were to be recognized, the indoor meeting does not alone answer the needs of an effective system of public assembly.

The importance of firm adherence to a positive right to assemble in public open places is somewhat lessened, but by no means eliminated, by constitutional doctrines of equal protection. It is clear that, to the extent the government may decide to make public open places available, it must make them available on a nondiscriminatory basis. And it has been suggested that since the government will not undertake to prohibit all meetings and parades—American Legion and Sons of St. Patrick included—it will have to afford equal facilities to unorthodox groups as well. In normal times or circumstances that might be the case. But the system must be geared to meet abnormal conditions. And it is quite likely that a community under tension —in Mississippi or Alabama, for example—would elect to cut off all public assemblies, at least for a time.

Moreover, the rule against discrimination presumably would not prohibit "reasonable" differentiations. It would forbid distinctions based on race or political views. But it might permit certain "educational" or "religious" forms of assembly while prohibiting "political" forms. Thus, much dissenting expression would be eliminated.

The legal rules must, of course, make some provision for resolving the various issues which arise from an acceptance of the right to use public open spaces for assembly. They must establish the point at which the public assembly no longer involves expression but action, and therefore becomes subject to control in the interests of order. They must also establish the means by which a community can maintain other uses of its open spaces, and therefore accommodate competing interests. And they must lay down the principles under which permit systems

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or other methods of administering the rules can function effectively without choking off the basic right.

But all these are matters of *regulation*. To deny the right itself is to give the government the power of *prohibition*. It is the equivalent of authorizing the government to deny citizens any right to publish a newspaper, print a book, make a movie, or broadcast over the air waves. It would, in short, allow the government to suppress one major medium of communication, the one most vital to the minority or submerged sectors of the population.

The Supreme Court first addressed itself to these issues in *Davis* v. *Massachusetts*, decided in 1897. In that case a Boston ordinance provided that no person "shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address, discharge any cannon or firearm, expose for sale any goods, wares or merchandise . . . except in accordance with a permit from the mayor." Davis was convicted for making a speech on Boston Common without permission of the mayor. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, saying: "For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."

The Davis rule, equating public and private property, flatly denied the right of public assembly. But four decades later, in 1939, the Court took another look at the issue. The case involved a suit by the CIO to enjoin Mayor Hague from interfering with the holding of public meetings and the distribution of leaflets on the streets of Jersey City. The Supreme Court refused to follow the precedent of the Davis case and upheld the CIO. Justice Roberts, speaking for himself and Justice Black, said: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens."

While there was no majority opinion in the Hague case,





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it was generally assumed thereafter that the Roberts statement embodied the law and that a constitutional right to use public open places for public assemblies did exist. Other statements of the Court during the 1940s tended to confirm this position.

Thus the matter stood when the first case to raise the issue in the context of a civil rights demonstration reached the Court in 1963. In *Edwards* v. *South Carolina,* a group of 187 Negro students marched to the Statehouse in Columbia, S. C., and walked through the capitol grounds, carrying placards protesting segregation. When ordered to leave, the students refused. Instead, they sang songs, clapped and stamped their feet; one of their leaders made a speech. Although a crowd of 200 to 300 whites gathered, showing some hostility, there was no violence or disorder. The students were charged with breach of the peace. Their convictions were overturned by the Supreme Court, Justice Clark alone dissenting.

Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's opinion, did not expressly deal with the question of whether the students had a constitutional right to use the capitol grounds for their demonstration. But he did say that the demonstration was a clear exercise of "petitioners' constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for the redress of their grievances." He then went on to hold that the South Carolina breach-of-peace statute, construed to prohibit the conduct involved, was so "vague and indefinite" as to violate constitutional rights. The general view taken of the decision was that the Court was accepting the Hague rule.

But two years later, in *Cox* v. *Louisiana,* serious doubts were cast. In this case the Supreme Court reversed convictions of the Rev. Elton Cox for leading a mass demonstration of some 2,000 students who marched from the Old State Capitol building in Baton Rouge to the courthouse, where they sang, prayed and listened to a speech. They were protesting the arrest of some fellow students who were confined in the jail, located in the courthouse building, for picketing stores which maintained segregated lunch counters. A large crowd of whites was present, but again there was no violence or disorder.

The conviction of the Reverend Cox for breach of the peace was set aside on the ground that his conduct did not actually amount to a breach of the peace and that the breach-of-peace statute was too broadly drawn. In this respect the Court closely followed the Edwards case.

But Cox was also convicted on a second charge, that of obstructing public passages. The Supreme Court did not consider the obstruction statute to have the defect of vagueness, which had been fatal in the breach-of-peace statute. Moreover, strictly applied, the obstruction statute effected a total prohibition of the use of the streets for public assemblies. In this phase of the case, therefore, the basic right to use public open places appeared to be involved.

Nevertheless, Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, held it unnecessary to decide the question. He found that the obstruction statute had not been strictly enforced; that some meetings and parades had been allowed; and that this delegation of uncontrolled discretion to the Baton Rouge authorities to permit or prohibit assemblies violated First Amendment rights. This disposition of the matter created no new doctrine.

More significant was Justice Goldberg's introductory sentence: "We have no occasion in this case to consider the constitutionality of the uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory application of a statute forbidding all access to streets and other public facilities for parades and meetings." He thus expressly refrained from affirming the doctrine of the Hague case and deliberately left the matter open.

Justice Black, concurring in the Cox case, did deal with the question left open in the majority opinion. It was his view that the First and Fourteenth Amendments took away, from federal and state governments respectively, "all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly *where people have a right to be for such purposes*." (Justice Black's italics.) "This does not mean," he went on, "that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property." Thus Justice Black squarely took the position that the government could ban, provided it did so without discrimination, most forms of assembly in public open spaces.

The Adderley case resembled in many ways the Edwards and Cox cases. A group of about 200 Negro students from Florida A. and M. University in Tallahassee marched from the university to the county jail, about a mile away. They were protesting the arrest of fellow students, then confined in the jail, for attempting to integrate public theatres the day before. The group entered the jail driveway and went up to the entrance. When a deputy sheriff requested them to move back, they did so. They then "stood or sat, singing, clapping and dancing, on the jail driveway and on an adjacent grassy area upon the jail premises." When the sheriff arrived he ordered the students to leave and, when some of them did not, arrested them for violating the trespass statute. Here also there was no violence or disorder.

Justice Black wrote the opinion for the majority of five who upheld the convictions. He distinguished the case from the Edwards and Cox cases primarily upon the ground that those decisions had rested on the vagueness of the breach-of-peace charges, whereas no such flaw inhered in the trespass statute. Reaching the central issue, the opinion declared, in language reminiscent of *Davis* v. *Massachusetts*: "The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." And it concluded: "The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose."

Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas, delivered the opinion for the dissenters. "The jailhouse," he pointed out, "like an executive mansion, a legislative chamber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself . . . is one of the seats of government whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or a small county jail. And when it houses political prisoners or those whom many think are unjustly held, it is an obvious center for protest." Stressing the significance of the right to assemble and petition, in much the same language that Justice Black had used in the sound-truck case, Justice Douglas went on:

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> There may be some instances in which assemblies and petitions for redress of grievances are not consistent with other necessary purposes of public property. A noisy meeting may be out of keeping with the serenity of the statehouse or the quiet of the courthouse. No one, for example, would suggest that the Senate gallery is the proper place for a vociferous protest rally. And, in other cases it may be necessary to adjust the right to petition for redress of grievances to the other interests inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put. . . . But this is quite different than saying that all public places are off-limits to people with grievances.

The reach of the Adderley decision is by no means clear. It could mean a total withdrawal from Justice Roberts' (and Justice Black's) position in the Hague case. That is to say, the Court may be stating that the use of public open places for assembly purposes may not only be regulated but may be totally prohibited. Taking into account Justice Black's views in the Cox case, it seems fairly certain that that is what he means. And the dissent of Justice Douglas seems to read the majority opinion in this way.

If the decision carries this far, it can be described only as a disaster. For reasons already explained, a major portion of the constitutional structure protecting freedom of assembly rests on the basic right to utilize public open places. To abandon the Hague doctrine is to leave the legal system incapable of assuring any health or even life to the common man's medium of expression.

It is quite possible, on the other hand, that some of the Justices on the majority side did not mean to go that far. They may have had in mind merely to carve out some public areas to which the right of assembly does not extend. Thus Justice Black notes that a jail "built for security purposes" is different from the capitol grounds.

If this be the purport of the decision it is less alarming. The system of public assembly is not destroyed by a rule prohibiting demonstrations on jailhouse grounds. But even from this viewpoint the decision remains disturbing.

The concern arises over the method by which the Court reaches its conclusion and the implications of its reasoning. As Justice Douglas points out, a jail is, historically and currently, "an obvious center for protest." In the case before the Court the conduct of the students involved no violence or threat of violence, created no disorder, resulted in no obstruction that could not have been rectified by the authorities present, and brought no danger to the security of the jail. Why then prohibit such a demonstration?

The majority's answer is simply to rely upon the trespass law. But the trespass law is based exclusively upon the concept of ownership. It merely reiterates that ownership entails the right to keep uninvited persons off the premises. As already noted, this fact of ownership, so far as public open spaces are concerned, ought not to operate by itself to prevent exercise of the right of assembly. In terms of the basic requirements of a system of free public assembly, that factor is irrelevant.

If the Court had intended to preserve the Hague rule, it should have approached the issue in a different manner. It should have considered those factors which are relevant to appropriate regulation. This would have involved an appraisal of the specific circumstances of the demonstration: the time it occurred; the extent to which it interfered with other uses of the space; the threat in the situation of violence or disorder. Had it done this, as the minority did, one can hardly believe the majority would have reached its same conclusion.

In short, resort to the trespass rule, based wholly on the ownership factor, is consistent only with a theory of total prohibition. The failure of the Court to take the other approach suggests that repudiation of the Hague doctrine is indeed far advanced.

One other trend, discernible in recent treatments of the right of public assembly, is equally alarming. In support of his view that public property could be wholly closed to demonstrations, Justice Black took the position in the Cox case that "patrolling and marching" are "conduct" [action] and not "speech," and hence are not included within the protection of the First Amendment. Justice Goldberg expressed similar views in his opinion for the majority. He "emphatically" rejected the proposition that the First Amendment afforded the same freedom to "conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways" as it does to those "who communicate ideas by pure speech." The point was not mentioned in the Adderley case.

Such a doctrine drastically narrows the scope of the right of public assembly. Actually, taken to its logical conclusion, the argument would remove virtually all forms of assembly from the protection of the First Amendment. Why, for instance, does the holding of a street corner meeting involve any different kind of conduct than patrolling with placards on the same corner? (Labor picketing, which automatically evokes economic coercion, is a different matter.) Moreover, even the elimination of "patrolling and marching" would cut deeply into the rights protected.

It is difficult to see how these views of public assembly can be justified. The First Amendment, in express terms, guarantees not only freedom of "speech" and of "the press" but also "the right of the people peaceably to assemble." Obviously this right of assembly contemplates more than "pure speech." Any adequate interpretation of the First Amendment requires that the Court bring within its protection those forms of conduct which are integral parts of, and essential to, exercise of the right of expression. Surely "patrolling and marching" are essential to make effective the right of assembly as a vital "instrument of communication." Here also the Court, while not yet fully committed to the new doctrine, seems headed in the wrong direction.

The Supreme Court in the Adderley case undoubtedly was concerned that demonstrations and direct action not deteriorate into the settlement of political issues through violence on the streets. This concern is shared by the whole country. The community possesses adequate power, however, to deal with violence or other forms of action. Moreover, it must be remembered that all important social and political movements in this country have been accompanied by strain on local law and order. The tensions between change and order cannot be totally eliminated, but they can be accommodated, among other ways, by an effective system of free expression. One leaves the Adderley decision with the unquiet feeling that the constitutional foundations of such a system are being compromised.

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

English In Its American Fashion

MODERN AMERICAN USAGE: A Guide. *By Wilson Follett. Edited and completed by Jacques Barzun, in collaboration with Carlos Baker, Frederick W. Dupee, Dudley Fitts, James D. Hart, Phyllis McGinley and Lionel Trilling. Hill and Wang. 436 pp. $7.50.*

MARIO PEI

Mr. Pei is a linguist, teacher and author of numerous articles and books on language.

Wilson Follett, essayist, editor and teacher, left at the time of his death in 1963 an unfinished manuscript, more than two-thirds completed which, by the words of his own 1958 prospectus, aspired "to do for the America of 1960 what Fowler did for the England of 1926." The unfinished manuscript was edited and completed by Jacques Barzun in collaboration with the distinguished group listed above.

Despite the confidence inspired by this impressive roster of names, the reviewer is faced with a release issued by Follett's widow. This states in part:

> . . . readers . . . [who] are familiar with Mr. Follett's editorial and critical writing, will be struck by the disparity between the qualities of this posthumously edited work and the style, rhetoric, linguistic exactness, and editorial workmanship that distinguished Mr. Follett's work while he was living. . . . For the benefit of such readers, some of whom will wish to determine for themselves whether they are or are not reading Follett, and as a matter of record that I think no more than the just due of an uncommon editor, writer, and teacher of writing, I shall shortly ask Harvard College and the Library of Congress to accept copies of the original 175,000-word manuscript from which *Modern American Usage* was prepared. . . . Meanwhile, the availability of the original manuscript will in part rectify the oddness of an edited work that variously and vaguely attributes authorship to one dead writer and seven living ones and documents neither the contribution nor the editing of any one of them.

The question of individual responsibility thus becomes a matter of exegesis, to be slowly and accurately worked out by future scholarship. Meanwhile, we are faced with a marketable book which must be reviewed on its collective merits. The reader must be reminded at the outset that whatever is said about the work applies to the book itself, and is not to be interpreted as a judgment on either Follett, or Barzun and his collaborators, at least until such a time as individual contributions are thoroughly established.

The philosophy underlying the work is set by Follett himself, in his prospectus of 1958:

> My book is not going to be written to bless the uses of language that I find no better than tolerable. In this respect it is at the opposite pole from general dictionaries, which exist to record whatever is and rest on an assumption that what is good enough for many is good enough for all. I am not interested in language on this permissive basis—in diction that is merely allowable or defensible. Never mind what can be endured: my objective is what is really good, what is best. . . . It is time we had an American book of usage grounded in the philosophy that the best in language—which is often the simplest—is not too good to be aspired to. Let who will define good usage as what a swarm of folk say and write by reason of laziness, heedlessness, or plain ignorance: *Modern American Usage* will tacitly define it as what the judicious say and write as a result of conscious discriminations.

Practically nothing in the work itself contradicts this basic point of view. In the introductory section the point is made that change does not necessarily mean life, but may mean death too, as proved by the fact that modern science arrests "natural" change, such as the spreading of cancer cells, by "artificial" and deliberate devices. Conscious purpose and reason interfere with "nature," and the result is embodied in the written tradition. Language does not consist of "speechways" alone, and the written, literary tongue, which some extremists among descriptive linguists refuse to dignify by the name of language, has its rights.

Further along, issue is taken with the descriptivistic doctrine, and normative grammar is defended and upheld. "Prose is not necessarily good because it obeys the rules of syntax, but" (Joyce and his admirers to the contrary) "it is fairly certain to be bad if it ignores them." The hostility to Latin among linguists and educators is described as "perverse" and is properly castigated.

This sets the volume in an anti-descriptivistic, anti-untutored-usage category which is altogether at variance not merely with the advocates of "Leave Your Language Alone!," but even with such half-reasonable apostles of popular usage as Bergen Evans. To what extent does this conservative philosophy of usage tend to duplicate Fowler's? There are sections of the book which are reminiscent not merely of the recent, watered-down versions of that writer's *Modern English Usage* produced by Margaret Nicholson and Sir Ernest Gowers but even of the earlier, infinitely prescriptive *The King's English* which Fowler prepared in collaboration with his brother in 1906.

In that work, the Fowlers presented long lists of quotations from the greatest English authors, from Chaucer down to Dickens and Thackeray, and labeled their usages "incorrect" on the basis of their own *arbitrium*. Follett tells us: "The argument from mere precedent which takes the form 'if it was good enough for Thackeray, it's good enough for me,' could make one's writing a mere concentration of solecisms, since every good writer has resorted to expressions without which he would have been a better writer." Again, in connection with the use of *like* for *as*, we are reminded of "the futility of the argument from history." Yet history, in the person of Byron, is cited only two pages before in connection with the distinction between *lie* and *lay*, whose overlapping forms are said to "cause more trouble than they are worth, and trip up even careful speakers."

This is a bit confusing. Even more confusing is the Appendix on *shall* (*should*), *will* (*would*), where the Follett volume starts off by taking issue with the Fowlers' snippy pronouncement about what is right and wrong (only southern Englishmen really know how to use those forms, according to the English authors), but then goes on to restate, at a cost of over 20 pages, nearly all of the Fowler prescriptions, including such natural ones as the proverbial stricture on "I will drown! Nobody shall save me!," and such unnatural ones as "He said he should be too busy to come today" (use *should*, not *would*, because in direct discourse you would expect *shall*, not *will*). Follett concludes by advising us that "with a little effort, 'anyone' can gain a command

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of the principles" (the quotes around 'anyone' are mine).

So far, with the single exception of the one surprising bit of permissiveness about *lie* and *lay*, prescriptivism is in the saddle. There is another concession to modern times in the toleration and even encouragement of the split infinitive. But as against this, we have a mass of examples which even a linguistic conservative like me would tend to regard as unnecessary quibbles; for instance, the distinction between *This is not a very good book* and *This book is not very good* (the first is said to imply that the writer had been led to believe the book was good; the second is said to express the writer's own conclusion). Despite the 2 pages devoted to distinctions between *although* and *though*, the only one that really makes sense to me is that *though* may be used at the end of a sentence and *although* may not. The distinction between *chivalric* and *chivalrous* is perhaps too finely drawn, as is that between *personage* and *personality* and even, for modern times, that between *less* and *fewer*, when we consider that *more* is the opposite of both.

Like Evans, Follett objects to a number of cliché expressions which have by now become second nature to American speakers. Some of Follett's aversions are *compared with*; *if and when* (yet it is conceivable that *when* may come into legitimate play once the condition presented by *if* has been fulfilled); the use of the suffix *-ful* in *meaningful, suspenseful, flavorful*, which are classed right along with such monstrosities as *insightful, characterful, resultful*; *on the other hand* (here Follett seems to imply that this is justified only by a previous *on the one hand*); *in whole or in part* (precisely what is objectionable in *one-fourth of the school districts are already integrated in whole or in part*?); *as per your memorandum* (is the business world not entitled to its jargon?); *personal guidance* (is there no such thing as mass or group guidance?), *language laboratory* (Follett calls it a misnomer, and would prefer *language gymnasium*).

Follett joins Fowler in advocating the use of *that* as a defining or restricting relative pronoun, of *which* as nondefining. For this there is no historical, etymological or literary justification, and the distinction between "restrictive" and "nonrestrictive" clauses is tenuous at best.

Follett objects to the use of the suffix *-wise* in such forms as *marketwise, percentagewise*, and calls it a sample of "inarticulate" English. He evidently fails to recognize that English, having largely discarded traditional case-endings, occasionally experiences the need to restore them, and that the *-wise* suffix supplies a perfect parallel for the Latin ablative of manner or specification, just as the *-ward* of *skyward* gives us a limit-of-motion case. But there is no mention in Follett, even under the heading "Danglers," of the ugly current ellipsis represented by *So far as the new taxes, I'm in favor of them.* (Even the late President Kennedy was occasionally guilty of this solecism.) As between *sales-wise* and *so far as sales*, unfollowed by *are concerned*, I should prefer the former, which also saves time and space with no detriment to meaning.

In view of the book's strongly prescriptive tendencies, it is surprising to find the current repetition of the conjunction *that* receiving what amounts to absolution: *He said that if you came today that I should give you this book.* In addition, there are several omissions of general malpractices. Gobbledygook is nowhere mentioned (the nearest censured relatives are scientism, vogue words and "the pseudo-science of the ologists"); but *senior citizen* comes in for a deserved drubbing. Under "Uses of the possessive," we look in vain for the type of remote possessive that is glorified in the writings of one of our most prominent descriptive linguists (*The girl I was telling you about yesterday's father*), or, under other appropriate headings, for those other gems of language: *Somebody left their books on this table* and *Forget about you haven't had your lunch yet*, similarly quoted with warm approval by the same descriptivist, Robert A. Hall, Jr., in his *Introductory Linguistics*. Under *-ability*, we are told about the two endings *-able* and *-ible*, but it would have helped the cause of good usage if lists of common words where the endings are confused had been provided.

Not too much reference is made to foreign languages, but we wonder about the literal translations of *à fond* as "to the bottom" and *au fond* as "at (the) bottom." *Canti fermi* is labeled as Latin, but unless *fermi* is changed to *firmi* it qualifies much better as Italian. In England the Foreign Office would be more likely to *secretise* than to *secretize*. *Diction* is equated with vocabulary or choice of words rather than with delivery, despite its etymological derivation from *dico*, "to say." *Imply* is etymologically explained as "to fold in," but *infer* is presented in the same sentence as "to draw from," which makes one wonder whether etymology or usage is the criterion. *Reaction* is said to be "by definition" (whose definition?) "automatic, unconscious, uncontrolled." Why is *uncontrollable* the only possible form? (*incontrollable* has been in use since 1599). *Now* is said to have gone into an eclipse in the face of *currently, presently*, etc., but a current radio-TV ad features *the now car.*

Euphemisms (listed under "Genteelisms") justly include, among other words, *disturbed, adjust, backward* and *underdeveloped*. Follett's "Vogue Words" include forms to which semantic time-bombs have been attached, such as *discrimination* and *collaborator*. Other misused words are *available* (a magazine's *This article is unavailable to us*, accompanied by a rejection slip); *communicate* (used in dozens of different ways where *speak, say, tell* would serve equally well); *contact* as a verb; *to implement*; *to process* (*Your check is being processed*, a euphemism for *is being held up*); *to structure* (and how about the military *destruct* where we already have *destroy*?); the ineffable *exciting*, now used *à tort et à travers*; and, of course, hopefully as a loan-translation of German *hoffentlich*, whose rapid march into widespread and indiscriminate usage is such that we cannot even "hopefully" hope to halt it. There is *togetherness*, tracked down to Khalil Gibran (may his tribe *not* increase!). Under *up* we miss the vogue phrase, *to point up*, beloved of editors.

The final section on "Punctuation" starts off with a basically accurate statement to the effect that the modern system flouts both the ear and the eye. One wonders why stylistically minded copy editors have to interfere with a writer's own consciousness of what he wants, in accordance with his own sense of logic and voice-spacing. Why has the hyphen been all but banished from the printed language? It would so simplify Follett's problem of *fishing-hat*, or of *speech-form* and *father-fixation*. Why can we no longer have it after *non-, or semi-*, where it seems to serve a useful purpose? Once, when my *non-national* came back in proof as *nonnational*, I wondered, for a few brief seconds, whether I had created by implication a new noun, *nonnation*, and a new verb, *to nonnate*.

But then Follett insists, with some copy editors, that there should be a comma before *and* in a series such as *France, Spain, and Italy*, and claims that only reasons of space justify its omission. Yet there is no such break of the voice after *Spain* as there is before, unless one is speaking very emphatically. The comma is condemned in such a line as *and, behind us, crept the night*; but it is recommended for *the states east of the Mississippi, where weather conditions are favorable*, if one wants to imply that he is speaking of only some of those states; and the question arises, if a distinction must be made, why not say *those states* instead of *the states*? Under "Informal

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'U.S. OFFERS CONDOLENCE AND AID TO VIETNAMESE BOMBED IN ERROR'

New York Times, 9/29/66

1

There is rejoicing at Hombe:
Only thirty-five persons died,
Only seventeen were injured
As compared with a hundred and sixteen thatch and wattle homes destroyed.
This means that most of the people
Must have been out of the hamlet
When the Marine pilots
Made their little mistake,
Bombing not reds but allies,
Members of the militia force, their wives and children.

2

There is rejoicing at Hombe:
Each dead person's next of kin
Has already received
The standard condolence payment,
Four thousand piastres or about thirty-four dollars,
And lesser amounts
Went to the wounded, depending
Upon the extent of their injuries.
Furthermore, survivors
Are expected to sue the United States
For additional compensation —
A standard procedure, virtually,
In such circumstances,
Circumstances virtually standard by now.

3

There is rejoicing at Hombe:
Never before have the villagers
Made a profit out of the death
Of a nearest relative. Never
Has the richest of them supposed
That a life could be worth so much money
Or that governments could be sued
For what, after all, must happen sooner or later.

4

There is rejoicing at Hombe,
Mingled with dissatisfaction:
Bomb us again, they beg,
Our protectors, our liberators,
We still have people to spare
But not enough rice to feed them,
Now that the fields are churned up.
Let the survivors be few,
So that cousins and uncles and nieces
May earn them wealth more like yours,
Whose corpses in funeral parlors
Lie radiant, as good as alive,
Or frozen await resurrection.
Let them leave the site, then, for ever,
And the ghosts of kin they had loved.
Blast Hombe out of your maps and our minds.

MICHAEL HAMBURGER

Colon," an "informal" usage is recommended which strikes me as quite unusual: *Then he wondered How the devil did I ever get into such a fix?* Would not colon and quotes be better? Or indirect discourse?

The relative position of closing parenthesis and period is left to the writer's discretion and the logic of the situation (one feels like saying: "Tell it to the copy editors!"). But then we are told: "The period goes inside the closing quotation mark." Why, if it is the logical conclusion of everything that has gone before, including what is not contained in the quotes?

Perusal of Follett and earlier manuals of usage leads to certain considerations which bear upon the language in general and its vagaries. In the matter of pronunciation, Follett gives as the sole plural of *alga* a pronunciation *-jee* for a written form *algae*; *-ee* for *alumnae*, *-eye* for *alumni*. This is somewhat on a par with British *paytuhr* and *maytuhr* for Latin *pater* and *mater*. Ought not more respect be shown for the original Latin? Webster III, for all its modernism, gives the Latin as well as the British public-school pronunciations.

Follett distinguishes carefully between masculine *bourgeois* and feminine *bourgeoise*, but offers *bravo* as the sole operatic exclamation of approval. Again, Webster III, along with Fowler, gives the correct feminine *brava*.

English is replete with confusing pronunciations, spellings and meanings. It might not take too much effort to straighten out the most glaring cases, were it not for the fact that we have no Voice of Authority, such as a Language Academy. Take the case of *forgo* and *forego*, pronounced alike, but not to be confused. The *for-* of *forgo* is an intensive prefix akin to German *ver-*, while *fore-* is temporal, and from the same root as *before* (German *vor-*). One means "to do without," the other "to precede." Or take the utter confusion that prevails in the case of *fulsome*. Follett and other manuals of usage imply that it should appear only in the sense of "disgusting" or "nauseating," but the Oxford dictionary, among others, presents it in the primary historical meaning of "abundant," "plentiful," "full," "plump." All etymologize *fulsome* from *full*, but it seems likely to me that somewhere along the line there was a merger of *fulsome* from *full* (Anglo-Saxon *full*, later *ful*) and *fulsome* from *foul* (Anglo-Saxon *ful*, pronounced as in *fool*, later *ful*), which would account for the discrepancy in meaning. Take, as a third horrible example, *viable*, which is derived from French *vie* (in turn derived from Latin *vita*) and has to do with life,

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but tricks even etymologists into thinking it comes from Latin *via*, "way," with the result that many use it as a synonym for "passable," "something for which a way can be found, or a road built."

Prof. Parry Moon of MIT once undertook a project to standardize scientific terms in various languages so that they would have similar forms and uses (as a single example: chemical binary compounds, which in English bear the *-ide* suffix of *iodide, sulphide,* have in Italian the suffix *-uro,* as in *ioduro, solfuro*; it was Moon's idea that either English should accept *-ure*, or Italian should accept *-ido*, so that we would have *ioduro* and *iodure*, or *iodido* and *iodide*). But far more than scientific terms seem to call for standardization in this age of expanding international communications. Both Follett and Fowler issue fulminations against *transpire* in the sense of "to happen." In the Romance languages, the root of *transpire* means "to sweat," as it once did in English, so that where we have *perspiration*, French has *transpiration. Constipate*, which etymologically means "to press together," is primarily used in English for a condition of the bowels, but in the Romance languages for a state of the nasal passages. As a boy of 8, fresh from Italy, I can recall the guffaws that went up in class when I explained my previous day's absence because of a head cold on grounds of "constipation." Would there not be a way of standardizing these usages internationally, and thus doing away with hundreds of deceptive cognates and "false friends"?

Logic goes out the window, Follett implies, when we speak of *unbending* and *to unbend*. He might have added the opposite meanings of *cleave* (*to cleave to*; *to cleave in two*). Of course, all language and all languages are illogical. But English is among the worst offenders in this respect. When Follett tries to outline the uses of transitive and intransitive verbs, he glosses over that enormity, unparalleled in any other language I know, whereby English uses a verb in the passive with a direct object following, and a grammatical subject which is logically the indirect object (*I was given this money*; *He was told this story*). From the standpoint of logic, it seems to me that this is just a little worse than even Spanish *Se me dió el dinero* ("The money gave itself to me"), or *Se mató al hombre* ("It killed itself the man," meaning "The man was killed"); and no amount of rationalization by Jespersen will convince me of the contrary.

The use of the *-ly* suffix, normally adverbial, but often adjectival, is another sore spot. *Go slow* or *Go slowly*? *The dog wagged its tail in a friendly manner*, but hardly *The dog wagged its tail friendlily*.

In conclusion, manuals of usage, while they serve a purpose, are not the panacea imagined by some of their worshipers. Neither are they the diabolical devices described by some descriptive linguists (one of the latter recently compared them to quack cancer cures). There is in them, as in the language they attempt to describe and prescribe, an arbitrary element which is inherent and, one is almost tempted to say, indispensable. There is also a perennial clash between historical etymology and current usage, and no manual writer so far, to my knowledge, has attempted altogether to eschew the one or the other. When history and present-day usage are blended, it is a little like mixing oil and water. Shake well, and you get not a solution but a suspension of particles of one liquid in the other.

Return to the Bush

SOUTH OF THE MOON: On Stanley's Trail Through The Dark Continent. *By Blaine Littell. Harper & Row. 300 pp. $6.95.*

SOUTH WEST AFRICA: The Last Pioneer Country. *By Thomas Molnar. Fleet Publishing Co. 160 pp. $4.*

EDWARD T. CHASE

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The dominating question about the Third World, *le tiers monde* that comprises the emerging states of Latin America, Asia and Africa, is: *can it sustain workable governments and economies based upon the consent of the governed?* Here is a prediction about sub-Saharan Africa by Blaine Littell:

> What is happening is a steady, inexorable return to the bush. . . . It is an almost imperceptible movement, this return to the past, and those who are looking for masses of marching men accompanied by martial music and ringing proclamations will never see it. Rather it is a quiet drift, but the trail is clear, marked as it is by abandoned cars which need only gasoline to make them run again, by discarded radios requiring only batteries to bring them back to life, and by vanishing roads and crumbling, vine-choked plantation homes. It will not take nature long to obliterate these final reminders of the white men's occupation of this land. . . . I do not see anything on the horizon, I can imagine nothing which will halt or even slow this return to the bush.

Thus does ex-C.B.S. foreign correspondent, erstwhile New York *Herald Tribune* reporter, writer for *The Reporter* magazine, Yale-Columbia alumnus write off Africa in *South of the Moon*. It is at the close of his account of his five-month re-creation via Land-Rover of Sir Henry M. Stanley's three-year journey of 1874-77. Mr. Littell's book arrives at a time when intensified tribal warfare, assassinations, the United Nations uproar over Rhodesia and over the South West Africa cases bespeak a continent in disarray; so perhaps Littell's pessimism would seem unremarkable. But in fact it derives from private ruminations after months of direct observation "in the bush," far away from the headlines.

It is particularly unsettling to see that Littell's view now coincides with the traditional outlook of cynics like Thomas Molnar, who proclaim that, given independence, the African must fail, at least for as far as one can see into the future. Mr. Molnar is an outspoken admirer of apartheid and he shares with Mr. Littell the capacity to make portentous inferences from the sight of abandoned automobiles, left by indolent savages to rot on the veld. To Molnar's credit, however, he, like Littell, has traveled to Africa to see for himself. His special value as an observer is that he has just been to South West Africa, that most remote of immense areas, the size of France and Great Britain combined. His reporting helps to make comprehensible some of the bewildering claims and counterclaims now being made at the United Nations.

So at this stage in the adventure of African independence, now ten years after the emergence of a free Morocco and Tunisia (and Ghana in 1957, Guinea in 1958), these two new books struggle again with the white man's perennial anxiety: is the Negro inferior? In the fierce controversy about what is possible as well as probable in Africa, ultimately one always gets back to this hoary issue. No matter its apparent impertinence, the reality is that the race question cruelly shapes every prognostication about Africa's future. No matter that undigested abstractions are tossed about in such debates. Ideas that prevail, whatever their lack of merit, have their consequences in thousands of decisions, large and small. Embraced by a sufficient multitude, the very idea of Negro inferiority can project a bigot into a

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governorship in Georgia, or certify the sense of righteousness among the Rhodesian white minority or, more subtly, demoralize the black man even where he now holds sway. Recently in Tanzania, for instance, I asked the white lady managing the store at a state-owned camping lodge why a "native," most of whom are desperate to be part of the tiny wage-based economy, did not have the job. Their own leaders know they can't cope with money, she replied. (This, incidentally, after misquoting to me the prices for film and then giving me the wrong change for my purchase.)

To be fair, Littell's is an account sympathetic to the Negro, but the brunt of his anecdotes stresses Negro unpredictability, irrationality and inadequacy. Many of his stories are wonderfully funny, some are horrifying. He concludes, in his embarrassing final pages, that the African reverted to the bush is somehow the better for it: "The jungle; the bush; the open savanna. It was here, where he was born, that the black man would return to slough off the imperfectly grafted skin of civilization, to regain his sense of superiority. Yes, here *he* was superior—to the animals he stalked and to the white man who had stalked him."

Littell's approach is impressionistic; Molnar's is a show of "logic." Molnar denounces the liberals sympathetic to South West Africa's freedom as irresponsible ideologues, ignorant of both the "incredibly complex situation" created by the ten tribal groups and primitive level of the natives, and of the wisdom of South Africa's harshly disciplined, paternalistic running of the country. He sees the Negroes as benefiting from their forced restriction to workers' compounds in the Police Zone, six men to a room, on their yearly exile from their families on contract jobs in the diamond mines. To illustrate how benevolent the white managers are, Molnar reports that "14 menus are worked out so that the same dish cannot appear on the table more than twice a month." The 600,000 Negroes should be grateful for whatever exploitations they are subject to by the 80,000 whites, Molnar suggests, since, as he so strongly emphasizes, until the Germans came in 1907, the black man lived under the constant threat of death from his fellow blacks.

Molnar has much to say, mostly negative, about the United States, some of it curiously ambivalent. He is still outraged over our treatment of the Indians and scores American hypocrisy with this anecdote: "A round table was called together in 1964 in Washington by a self-styled 'peace promoting' organization, which shall remain charitably unnamed. The announced objective was to invite various people knowledgeable on Africa, and some South Africans as well, and discuss ways and means to 'help' South Africa get out of its 'tragic situation.' The hypocrisy of the whole affair was in itself sickening; but the scandal cried to heaven since we gathered at the Cosmos Club where no black man was admitted to enter!" O.K., *touché*.

The American, Ernest Gross, chief counsel in the South West Africa cases before the World Court, is his *bête noire*. Despite his sensitivity to hyprocrisy, Molnar, however, never discloses throughout his long account of the cases the substance of Mr. Gross's charge: that in the forty years South Africa has run South West Africa no native ever has been qualified in law, medicine, engineering, nursing; none can be employed in a skilled occupation; none can join a union or move without permission or have a say in government or administration, or live except where one is told.

This would appear to have a bearing on the opening question of whether sub-Saharan Africa can sustain a viable government based on the consent of the governed. Are Littell and Molnar so wrong in their doubts? The only honest answer is "not necessarily." What cries for emphasis, rather, to put this into perspective, is to consider how desperately difficult it has been for peoples throughout most of the world to achieve this condition, some with states centuries old. Consider Europe in the 1930s and '40s, and much of the rest of the non-African world today. The American has trouble digesting the notion of the single-party state. But in a brand-new country, divided by ancient tribes in which the strongest nationalist movement in effect has become the state, is it reasonable to ask for a traditional two-party system? The happiest development and an immensely significant precedent is in Tanzania where the brilliant Julius Nyerere has devised the scheme of authorizing the single party to put up two candidates locally. The result has been political competition, a real choice for the voter.

The gravest doubts about Africa's future must arise from the economic situation. The populations of sub-Saharan Africa's countries are 90 per cent rural, with less than 20 per cent of the labor force in a wage economy. The agriculture worked by 80 per cent of the population is low in productivity, severely limiting the surplus on which greater diversification could be built through trade—where 80 per cent of families are farming, the market for food is only 0.25 of a family per farmer. Not until only 40 per cent are in farming does the market become 1.5 families. And whatever economic growth is attained tends to be undermined by a population growth of 3 per cent yearly.

Littell "can imagine nothing" to halt a reversion to the bush. Maybe. Yet Kenya already has accepted the principle of state-supported birth control. Other nations will follow suit. And the prodigies of mid-20th-century technology—which rebuilt a war-devastated Europe in a decade—surely hold out at least an *imagined* solution for these lands, now so accessible, thanks to the new technologies of jet air travel, instant communications and modern teaching tools.

More and More Alike

AS A CITY UPON A HILL: The Town in American History. *By Page Smith. Alfred A. Knopf. 332 pp. $6.95.*

SEYMOUR J. MANDELBAUM
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Page Smith's study of the small town in American history is essentially a deeply felt critique of urban society and culture. The city, he laments, encourages men to choose friends who have common interests, backgrounds and aspirations. "The result has been a progressive constriction and narrowing of personal relationships and their progressive impoverishment. Like accentuates like; boredom and ennui are bred by the homogeneity of subgroups with the larger community; and often a spurious heartiness masks a coldness of response and the careful maintenance of defences against unsolicited or unwelcome intrusions."

The city, he insists, is "depersonalized." Its values and controls "are increasingly developed outside the community by the vast industry whose business it is to produce in their laboratories synthetic values that are presented as 'entertainment' and as 'education,' and that are in truth as ephemeral as the daily paper." The freedom of the city has weakened local orthodoxies but has put in their place national dogmas which "have to be honored even more wholeheartedly and certainly more unanimously than before."

That's the moral guts of the book—not its subject. Smith's substantial theme is contained in the observation that up until the first decades of the 20th century most Americans lived in small country

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towns. A great many of these towns—how many is not clear, but more than we commonly imagine—were relatively homogeneous in their social composition, and enjoyed a sense of common purpose of identity. In its earliest forms, this sense was expressed in a formal church covenant; later, implicit secular covenants defined the nurturant boundaries of successful social units. These towns developed men who were inner-directed, untroubled by their own identity, and secure in their values. Launched in the world, they were unusually creative in fields which required independent judgment, patience and moral earnestness: the ministry, teaching, medicine and science. The towns themselves were capable of supporting the national community and national men of power without being engulfed by them. They were also coherent units, amenable to description and analysis and hence capable of literature.

In the 20th century the last of these communities have died or are dying. There were two important signs of morbidity. The first was the transformation of a charitable moral environment, which respected sexuality, into a repressive code of injunctions; the second was the replacement of the ethic of the covenant with the praise of the rugged individualist. The major cause of death, Smith argues, was the spread of urban influence. "Towns, whatever their origins," he writes, "grew more and more alike, not because of any logic inherent in the towns themselves, but because they came increasingly under the influence of urban culture and urban values."

The victims may have been more willing than Smith admits. He distinguishes between communities which were colonized by a single group or covenanted in a formal manner and those which grew out of bits and pieces of people—"cumulated," he calls it—because of unique economic opportunities available at a particular location. The two types of towns were essentially different, he argues, in their social organizations and their value systems. His own evidence suggests, however, that this may not be the case. He notes that covenanted towns were endemically unsuccessful in their business enterprises. At the point that they succeeded, they bit the urban dust. The other side of the same coin, which Smith does not explore, is the emergence of coherent "covenanted" communities in the unsuccessful remnants of once flourishing "cumulated" regions. Formerly prosperous coal towns in Appalachia illustrate this regression.

If differential success in the market place distinguishes the communities, then perhaps we need a more sympathetic image of the urban seducer. Americans, from very early in their history, have apparently valued both individual achievement and the pleasures of community. They have gambled on the main chance and, when necessary, have been willing to sacrifice community for cash. Quite literally, the towns reached out for the city, rather than the other way around.

This alternative hypothesis does not really detract from the main thrust of Smith's work. It's very likely, just as he says, that growing up in a stable small town is not quite the same as growing up in a city. A nation of cities is different from a nation of small towns. Cities which are manned by families old in urban ways are different from those flooded by new small-town recruits.

It is not at all clear, however, just what these differences are. Is Smith's characterization of urban society—deeply felt but not documented—correct? If we are truly becoming more bored, sterile and impersonal, what can we do about it?

The question of truth and the problem of action are separable. Correct or not, Page Smith is doing something about his view of urban civilization. After eleven years at UCLA he has moved up to Santa Cruz as provost of Cowell College in the university complex there. The Santa Cruz colleges are designed to be intellectual and social units which will provide an intimacy and interdisciplinary dialogue that critics charge is notably lacking at Berkeley. There is a strong resemblance between Smith's ideal town and the new colleges amidst the redwoods.

Santa Cruz is too young to know whether there are any costs in its design. What qualities that even Smith values will be lost or prove impossible? If Smith's criticism of the city is wholly correct, it is hard to imagine any costs in Santa Cruz's plan of organization. But the criticism is suspect. It smacks heavily of damning America for being dominated by the shallow values of the mass media—and then calling in witness only the mass media themselves. Smith talks freely of the impersonal city and ignores the impressive literature on the continuing importance of interpersonal relations in shaping the communities in which even city men live. He asserts that over the last several decades urban Americans have tended to talk less frequently and less intensely with men who differ from themselves in ethnic origin, occupation, income, religion or social perspective. He presents no evidence and would be hard pressed to prove the assertion. My sense of the matter is that its opposite would be a great deal easier to prove. Somehow the research in this sophisticated book never really touches or tests the core of Smith's own perspective upon American history and his emotional response to American culture.

ARCHITECTURE / ERVIN GALANTAY

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Historians of urban design show increasing interest in the formative role of the enlightened client on architecture and planning. The client with the vision to initiate ideas has at times left a more personal imprint on urban design than have the architects in his employ. In contemporary urban planning the single client has largely been replaced by the corporate or bureaucratic client, and the vision or whim of the individual has yielded to market analysis and the balanced compromise. Planners of New Towns in Europe, South America, Asia, have the state as their client, but in this country sizable New Towns still rise at the initiative of individuals pursuing profitable investment and—in some cases—following their personal vision of the commonweal.

In a previous article I examined Reston, Va., a New Town which has the personality of Robert E. Simon stamped over its design and rightly carries the initials of its developer in its name. Simon's planners, Whittlesey & Conkin, gave Reston an identity reflecting his determination to provide the good life in a perceptual environment of high quality.

Another rare kind of client, one who promotes an enlightened social philosophy, is James Rouse of Baltimore, widely known as banker, owner of shopping centers, champion of urban renewal and developer of the New Town, Columbia, Md. Mr. Rouse sees the city as the bearer of civilization and measures its worth on whether or not it contributes "to the growth development of mankind." Being dissatisfied in this respect with the performance of existing cities, Rouse set out to build his own, a "truly rational" city providing "the most viable soil for the growth of people," where they can live the full life as Rouse envisages it.

Listening to Rouse, one may surmise that social planning became his obses-

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sion—a sort of practical religion—yet he also pursues successful investment by shrewd business methods best exemplified in the strategy of planning his New Town. Unlike Simon, who bought an estate at bargain price and then decided to use it for a New Town, Rouse's organization —Community Research and Development, Inc. (CRD)—first determined the size of the future community and then made a systematic search for the best site. It was found in rural Howard County, Md., halfway between Washington and Baltimore, where large contiguous parcels could still be assembled for less than $1,500 per acre. Next, Rouse negotiated a $20 million loan with the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. It was a pioneering financial arrangement whereby repayment was deferred until the start of actual construction, thus assuring time for careful planning.

For his New Town staff, Rouse raided the National Capital Planning Commission and secured for CRD both William Finley, author of the "Year 2000 Plan," and Morton Hoppenfeld, his chief planner. The new CRD staff met regularly for six months with a work group of fourteen leading social scientists; collectively, they fathered the organization pattern of Columbia. Meanwhile, working in secrecy through dummy corporations, Rouse assembled 15,600 acres of land and in October, 1963, dumfounded the Howard County commissioners with the announcement that he controlled 10 per cent of the county's area. The commissioners—committed to preserve the rural character of the county—now became the targets of Rouse's two-pronged attack of evangelistic zeal and economic argument. After one year of siege, Howard County was won over to the cause and granted Rouse special zoning for Columbia.

Planned for a population of 110,000 by 1980, the New Town will generate 27,000 jobs, and it is expected that at least half of the job holders will live in Columbia. Rouse envisions a community with a diversified population and intends to provide housing for everyone employed in his town, from the $10,000 unit of the janitor to the 10-acre estate of the top executive. In contrast to Reston, with its villages focused on various forms of recreation, Columbia's concept is based on education. Neighborhoods of 300 to 500 families cluster around a nursery and elementary school. Five or more neighborhoods form a "village" focused on a high-school complex. Each village will also have a 2-acre green or plaza, shops and offices, a village hall, branch library, young people's club, an amphitheatre and 3 acres of land reserved for churches. Nine to ten villages will be served by a town center, with a community college and various civic and cultural buildings, in addition to a large shopping center.

Rouse hopes that this logical organization will endow each resident with a sense of belonging to the community, similar to the attachment of country folk to their villages and small towns. Critics like Berkeley's Christopher Alexander find however that the pattern suggests a hierarchy of closed social groups "based on associational ties of different strength" which are absent in modern urban society. Although Rouse speaks of a laboratory city, of an "urban test tube" where such ideas as "opportunity structures" can be examined. the social planning concept of Columbia is not boldly experimental but just a compendium of many things good and desirable. This lack of boldness may not be Rouse's fault: in meetings with his academic advisers it was generally Rouse who advanced brilliant and adventurous ideas while his consultants were more cautious. Still, the proposed pattern is clearly superior to that of the unstructured suburb or "non-community," to borrow a word from Rouse, who also claims that Columbia "may not be perfect but will be better."

To what extent will Rouse's lofty ideals and the logic of the social planning concept be matched by the physical pattern? What will be the impact of Columbia's visual environment on residents and visitors? In answering these questions one's ideas must be based on the plans and models of CRD, since ground has been broken at Columbia only recently. The edges of the New Town are defined by state and interstate highways, with Route 29, the "Columbia Pike," bisecting the town and providing access from four cloverleaf interchanges. By following the mainstream of traffic a visitor will easily discover the town center as the hub of regional shopping. The 1,800-foot-long shopping mall will be far bigger than the town alone could support. This vast shopping area will be surrounded by parking and girdled by a distributor loop for the traffic. A larger loop will embrace the commercial core, as well as the community college, a cultural campus and the town plaza of Columbia, separated from Route 29 by an artificial lake. In theory, the regional shoppers are needed to support Columbia's cultural facilities, but in physical appearance the cultural and civic areas are mere appendages to the shopping center, and the buildings of the town plaza reflected in their lake appear as a sublimated form of advertising aimed to attract traffic from the Columbia Pike. The center's movement pattern favors the visiting shoppers, and residents driving to their plaza will have to weave through the out-of-town traffic. To minimize this inconvenience, a minibus system will be operated for residents who comprise the important "captive market."

In contrast to the bustling town center will be the quaintness of the residential areas. A visitor proceeding through gently rolling hills will pass tree-shaded low-rise settlements with slightly increased densities around the village centers. Houses of all kinds will be provided by various builders. Confronted with a quasi-amorphous, vaguely repetitive pattern, the visitor may not immediately realize that he has arrived at the New Town unless he is struck by the presence of carefully designed small-scale elements: lampposts, signs, benches. He will find a street pattern of loops, clusters and cul-de-sacs borrowed from that thirty-year-old bag of tricks of the garden city planner and may experience the same difficulty in locating a friend's house as in any fanciful curvilinear subdivision. He will vainly seek guidance by architectural coherence or an overall town structure like the "sinews" proposed for Reston, but he may take comfort from the well-studied system of direction signs.

Planner Morton Hoppenfeld explains this casual residential pattern as having allowed "the land to impose itself as a discipline on the form of the community." If so, it is a mild discipline. Powerful topography, a mountain range or a river, can indeed structure the most disjointed agglomeration by providing orientation, a sense of location, of "there-ness." But in the absence of such features it is the task of the urban designer to provide visual guidance by a clear overall per-



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ceptual pattern. Leaving the creation of a sense of order to the accidents of topography, or to the social planners, amounts to the abdication of a key responsibility by the urban designer. Of course, the vast size of the town and the resulting low densities make it difficult to propose a cohesive pattern. The area is about 24 square miles or nearly ten times as big as the island city of Venice which has a population of 170,000, not counting pigeons, cats and tourists. Columbia also includes many enclaves not controlled by CRD—it is in Rouse's words a great "Swiss cheese"—and the "holes" add to the confusion. But since 3,700 acres will be reserved for recreation, the continuity of these green areas may link Columbia's villages in a comprehensive structure.

To me, Columbia's low density is a most questionable feature: compact spatial configurations like the old-fashioned street act as funnels for traffic and bring about the random, accidental contacts, the unpredictability and surprise of urban life. High densities and complex, overlapping land uses foster the competition, conflict and tension which are the salt and pepper of "urbanity." And since low physical proximity leads to increasing stratification, the looseness and spread of Columbia may counteract the stated goal of socio-economic integration. I cannot see how comfortably spread Columbia will arouse the dynamism essential to a society that aspires to contribute to the "growth development of mankind." In this the physical design is not equal to Rouse's great vision.

Both Reston and Columbia have been hailed as models for the future, yet they may remain isolated prototypes of the New Town, conjured up by individual enterprise. In the vicinity of the metropolitan areas where New Towns are most in demand, it is becoming impossible to find large tracts at prices that would make such ventures financially attractive to private developers. In the future some degree of government participation will be necessary, since New Towns are needed as the best alternative to capricious and wasteful suburban sprawl. Recognizing this, the Kennedy administration actively promoted the New Town idea, and President Johnson recommended on March 2, 1965, a program of "federally insured private loans backed by federal mortgages . . . to finance the acquisition and development of land for entirely new communities. . . ." In the terms of this cautiously worded bill, public bodies would assemble the land and resell developed land to private builders for construction. Unfortunately, Congress rejected this program and government interest has since shifted from New Towns back to the metropolis with the "Demonstration Cities" program.

This change in government emphasis is perhaps connected with the fact that the budding of New Towns has attracted increasingly acerbic criticism from leaders of center-city renewal. Thus Edmund Bacon of Philadelphia has implied that the New Towns may sap the vitality of the central city even more than do the bedroom suburbs, since they will lure those middle-class residents who remained loyal to the core city for the sake of urban amenities which the New Towns now attempt to supply. In CRD news releases one can find support for Bacon's contentions: Baltimore research firms are moving their plants, lock, stock and taxes to Columbia, taking with them the families of engineers, scientists and researchers. George Kostritsky, whose initiative once triggered Baltimore's spectacular Charles Center renewal, is concerned that the New Towns may contribute to racial stratification and compound the troubles of the core city. Rouse's pledge that CRD will be "color blind" in selling houses and apartments at Columbia does not quiet all suspicions. The type of employment offered includes relatively few blue-collar jobs. Negro home seekers in New Towns will be middle class or at least "upwardly socially mobile," and it worries sociologists like Hans Spiegel that their departure may deprive the central ghettos of much-needed leadership. In compensation, Spiegel demands that the New Towns should include 5 per cent hard-core, multiple-problem families in the lowest income bracket. These could be assimilated by a healthy new community and their inclusion would help to redress the balance with the center. But such a move is hardly attractive to the private developer who —no matter how idealistic—seeks profit or at least tries to break even.

None of this proves that we have to choose between center renewal and the development of New Towns; both are needed and should be complementary. A truism worth repeating is the fact that within the next forty years we shall have to duplicate all the housing built since the Pilgrim Fathers landed on Cape Cod. Even with accelerated urban renewal, the center cities will not be able to accommodate this demand. Hence a comprehensive national policy for the development of New Towns is needed. In this perspective, the great initiatives of Simon and of Rouse may have a historic importance beyond the success of Reston and Columbia. By exciting popular interest and building their demonstration New Towns they have helped to make the New Town idea familiar and acceptable to many Americans. With time, this familiarity may secure for the planning of New Towns high priority on the list of national goals toward a Society that may not be Great but will be, as Rouse hopes, "better."

Agit-Prop Pop Opera

JAMES O'CONNOR
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A middle-aged Negro jockeys an old Ford and flat-bed trailer into the parking space on San Francisco's Haight Street. The sad-eyed heads and acid freaks watch the maneuver from the Psychedelic Shop a few yards away. One of the actors slips a coin into the parking meter; another looks both ways—no fuzz in sight. From the inside of the car the signs are moved into the street: "Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee," "I'll Follow Him as a Nurse," "We'll Petition McNamara." The sidewalk fills up with the paraphernalia of agit-prop theatre—signs, comic-strip balloons, a first-aid box, tape recorder, speakers, costumes, outrageous military uniforms. Across the street in front of Be-Jay's Baby Shop two tourists stare. The tykes in the second-floor bay window looking directly down on the trailer are bug-eyed. Passers-by are suddenly stopped in their tracks by a loud, raspy tape of the Fugs singing *Kill for Peace* and Tom Lehrer doing *Send the Marines*, while the actors frug on the sidewalk and on the trailer. The overture of San Francisco's only pop opera, *Romeo and Pagliacci*, signals the start of the show's fiftieth performance.

"The Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee is one of the most active neighborhood peace groups in the Bay area." Nina Serrano Landau directs the show and trains the agit-prop theatre's cast, which includes political activists (not actors) and two of her own children. She has produced, directed and acted in shows around the Bay area for half a dozen years. She is an innovator. "But the war has dragged on and the committee wanted to get their message across to a wider audience. They wanted their message dramatized. In conventional theatre, the players are in motion and the audience is at rest. The opera reverses this relationship. We have to perform on a trailer or truck. Our audience is in motion and we have to stop them.

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We have to arrest their attention in the time it takes to stroll past the trailer. And we have to keep it for the time it takes the police to land on our heads." [Space is extremely limited and so is time, and to block the show things have to be kept very simple and direct.]

Now the opera is going full blast. The characters are identified by signs and it is impossible to lose the thread of the plot. Mom is sad because Romeo the Boy has been drafted. L. B. McNamara resists a plea for his deferment. Pagliacci the Girl decides to become an army nurse and join her lover, Romeo, in Vietnam. Both are killed in battle. The libretto is punchy and stylized. The score of familiar old tunes disarms the audience and puts it in a receptive mood.

The familiar melodies and sentimental plot constitute the solutions to the troupe's fundamental artistic problem. The pedestrian is at first embarrassed, stops. An anti-war street opera is not quite proper; yet he has been sought out by aggressive young people in costume and told to look and listen. The mood is not hostile or threatening; the pedestrian must be disarmed, won over. The melody of *Oklahoma* (with the words, "Stop the War Machine"), the strong rhythms, the bad jokes, the silly but almost believable tragedy of Romeo and Pagliacci are the tools of the agit-prop opera: today's pop culture dramatized for a simple message —*Stop the War.*

"God knows what our immediate inspiration is. Medieval theatre for one thing." Miss Landau mentioned particularly the Wisconsin Idea Theatre. The theatre conducted classes in which country people wrote plays about their immediate problems. But there was no theory of people's culture, and the idea died when the slogans were exposed as empty—"Make the boundaries of the university the boundaries of the state," "Recreation is the time to recreate our historic past." This was the Socialist pageant theatre of another age. "The psycho-drama and socio-drama movements of a dozen years ago, too. And the early improvisational techniques employed by SNCC and CORE to prepare nonviolent resisters." How much of the agit-prop opera is mere self-gratification? "I don't know."

During this performance on Haight Street teenie-boppers, heads and blonde demigoddesses carting around heavy knapsacks made an apathetic audience. At first the troupe did not establish contact with the audience. Then a few tourists, a gang of kids, some straight couples drifted up to the trailer. The police were nowhere to be seen and the risk of a ticket for carrying people in a trailer was slight. A second performance was decided by an impromptu conference among the actors. The show started to roll again, and the troupe was more spirited, movements were made with a great deal more assurance. There was no stagy acting or mime as such; the cast mouthed pre-recorded lyrics played over two speakers, jumped around, struck poses, crumpled to the trailer bed during the death scene. It was immediate, expressive, unself-conscious; the cast obviously wanted to share its pleasure. If the material were more complicated, the show would have been embarrassing. But the cast was the material; all else—songs and lyrics—were props. Suddenly the simple truth of this pop opera is apparent; the medium itself contains the real message. The joy itself of sharing a sense of optimism and good humor opposes the war. The climactic chant at the end of the performance—"stop the war machine, stop the war machine, stop the war machine" —is a ritualized expression devoid of ideological content. The troupe is not making a moral statement but rather living a public experience and inviting the onlooker to join.

"In Berkeley a lawyer danced through the streets. In Golden Gate Park the audience joined hands and danced with us. At Hunters Point (a Negro ghetto) the local residents saved us from possible trouble at the hands of an amateur-intellectual black nationalist theatre gang. Kids want to get into the opera. The only thing we really want to do is to get people together, transform them into a cohesive group as an audience for a brief moment, and make them reflect a little. The war is ridiculous, isn't it?"

The street lights came on and the cast began to pack up their equipment. They would park somewhere else and perform again. A few people had been themselves, briefly, and art had been a weapon. The war machine will continue to roll on, and some of the anti-war crowd will insist that only conventional political activity can be effective. Watching her 8-year-old daughter pass out the last of the anti-war leaflets the troupe always distributes after the show, Nina Landau agrees that message theatre has very sharp limitations as a political instrument. The opera itself is anti-war but contains no clear ideological message. The listener is reminded again that the play cannot be very complex, that the musical-pop opera form was chosen because it is adaptable to strong, simple statements. During a performance in Los Angeles at the New Politics conference, many New Left politicos in the crowd did not turn a head. They were too intent on pursuing their ideological disputes over whether to support Brown or no one. The ideological left-wing press has all but ignored the opera. But the underground press—the *Los Angeles Free Press* and *Berkeley Barb* —embraces and supports the troupe.

"But isn't that because you do not offer anything to oppose the war except yourselves?" This is a recognized problem. The second opera, *Li'l Red, White and Blue,* will appear on the streets and in the parks shortly. It is bitter, more concrete, more realistic, more serious. The troupe is becoming dissatisfied with *Romeo and Pagliacci.* They have performed it too many times and it has served its purpose. In the future there will be less self-gratification, more art and more politics. Nevertheless, it is certain that the medium itself will continue to be the real message. Imitations are springing up on the West Coast; political groups are asking for help to dramatize their cause. Suddenly there is a sense of responsibility.

Just before the troupe packs in and drives off in the car, Nina Landau's daughter is asked by the listener: "Why don't more people stop for the leaflet?"

"Just stupid," she answers.

THEATRE / Robert Pasolli

Mr. Pasolli became a free-lance writer in the theatre after working on Broadway, at Lincoln Center and, on a Ford Foundation grant, at the Tyrone Guthrie Theatre, Minneapolis.

Off-off-Broadway, the theatrical delights of satire, playfulness and scatology seem lately to have all but eclipsed the frankly serious poetic or metaphysical play. To an extent, this is simply a matter of operating from strength; those lighter genres are easier to do well with the limited means of coffeehouses, churches and lofts. Furthermore, such productions are more amenable to the fuller theatricalism characteristic of Off-off-Broadway (compared to, say, Off-Broadway) and hence more challenging to the visionaries who are its best practitioners. I don't for a moment regret the emphasis on play and sport on the stage, but I want to applaud the dark poeticism of two good new plays I saw recently—precisely because they are successful examples of a genre to which Off-off-Broadway and its supporters are increasingly inhospitable.

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Theatre Genesis, at St. Marks-in-the Bouwerie, has just done *The Key* by a playwright named Kit Jones. For a one-act monologue, the play is uncommonly full-bodied, escaping through vivid theatrical imagery and a reverberant theme the paucity of spirit that is the special curse of monologue. Not that *The Key* will rival Beckett's monologues; it lacks the demonic insight of *Krapp's Last Tape* and *Happy Days*, as well as their implacable, imperious rigor. But Kit Jones's play artfully and in short order presents us with a dense, engrossing drama—one that has the authority of fullness of life.

The semi-surrealist action of *The Key* is set in a naturalistic framework, which serves to lead us into and out of the hero's private experience. Arriving at his apartment door, William Smith gropes for his key and experiences a moment of panic before he finds it. The emotion triggers his account of the adventure from which he has just returned home; he tells it as much for himself as for us. We learn that he has been a conscientious librarian for fifteen years; that he leads a tight and tidy life; that he doesn't earn much money. We sense that he is a man whose taut psyche is about to snap; indeed, we come to the realization that his adventure is the breaking of the first cord.

Smith has spent the day in frenzied pursuit of a stranger who had snatched his apartment key as he left for work that morning. The chase led him throughout the city—up through tenements, down into the subway, into the library where he works, up through the stacks and down to the basement. The events and encounters of the chase are acted out and occasionally emphasized by a recorded voice-over account, suggesting interior monologue, which reinforces the sense of Smith's groping within the bizarre adventure.

Just how bizarre it really is comes through gradually: Smith is chasing a phantom. He has imagined the theft, mentally embodied the thief and then given actual chase. His phantom eludes him, however, at the moment of confrontation. Smith imagines the thief to have brushed past him, slipping the key into his pocket as he goes. In possession again, Smith can return home.

The flash-back account finished, Smith returns to the landing outside his apartment door to round out the play. From his fumbling for the meaning of his experience and from his carelessness with his hat, which falls down the stairwell as the play ends, I took it that his psychic distintegration had just begun.

The Key is an existential account of a man's descent into hell, with suggestions that it is only the first trip. The playwright makes it clear that Smith has been denied the achievements of life's possibilities: meaningful relationships, money and personal sway, professional position. In Smith's imagination he is now deprived of the one thing he did have—entry to his own private world, his home, his lair. With the loss of identity, which is the loss of self, Smith's disintegration is about to become total.

Jones rigidly delimits his depiction of Smith's experience to the manner in which Smith sees it. As fiction *The Key* shares the method of Sartre's *Nausea* and Camus' *The Stranger*, two reigning documents of existential malaise; to some extent it parallels their achievement in that it makes the particular so vivid that one hears reverberations to the general.

The Key is an imaginative, carefully structured, vividly imagistic play. Its occasional dramatic arbitrariness and its straining of theatrical means in rendering surrealistic adventure seem to me minor limitations. (As directed by the author and performed by Dennis Helfend, the production at Genesis was a creditable job.) I don't know who Kit Jones is, but neither did I know who the now vigorous playwrights Sam Shepard and Leonard Melfi were before Genesis began to produce and encourage their work. Genesis, it is to be remembered, means birth.

Another adventure play was recently presented at the Judson Poet's Theatre. Maryat Lee's *The Tightrope Walker* is more diffuse than *The Key*, but also more ambitious. Despite a degree of indefiniteness, it is a work of strange beauties. The tightrope walker is the artist, his roots in heaven, who pays with human isolation for his exhilarating gifts. To care for earthly contacts is to deny his art—"the wings turn into ornaments and eventually drop off," a master tells his apprentice, warning him not to get involved on earth. The play's action recounts the perilous adventure by which a young artist comes to recognize the truth of this advice.

Yoloy, the apprentice walker, yields to the tug to earth that plagues him on the tightrope. He locates the source of the pull—a former high-wire artist named Dell who fell to earth through human involvement—and attempts to take her back aloft. For a time he deals with the situation on earthly terms, fighting rationally and physically against Dell's ties to another earthling. Failing, he withdraws to return without her and this turns the trick. As in the Orpheus and Euridice legend, which the play parallels except for Orpheus' weakness at the last moment, Yoloy's strong example inspires Dell to follow him. Thus his artistic dedication redeems both of them.

As impressive as is the play's elaborate metaphorical conception, its special beauty is in the high-flown poetry of the language. Miss Lee has written in rhythmic cadences, liberally dosed with images related to flight and freedom. The particularly apposite image of the rope, representative both of the walker's art and the earthling's imprisonment, is ubiquitous.

The Judson production, directed by Foulkes Taylor, was something short of satisfactory; most regrettably it lacked forward drive. But performances by Richard Mason as Yoloy, Lee Worley as Dell and Robert Bonnard as the master walker were good, and Marvin Peisner's portrayal of Dell's earthly nemesis was superb.

The Tightrope Walker represents a successful renewal of the Judson's reputed hospitality to serious, high-flying theatre pieces during the early '60s, when the Poet's Theatre came into being. In recent years this most prominent of Off-off-Broadway groups has become known for a brand of impish, irreverent playfulness that has made it many friends (including me), but which is only one side of the new-theatre coin. Ironically, a production of the familiar sort, offered on the same bill with *The Tightrope Walker* was a wearisome failure despite the standard ingredients of music by Al Carmines, direction by Larry Kornfeld and performances by several Judson regulars. The doctored-up version of *The Love Cure*, linking Kornfeld's comments on American *moeurs* with Molière's satire on medicine, was a piece of hokum with almost no moments of delight and certainly without self-justifying relevance.

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

ACROSS:

1 As the soldiers left, the French market has to remove something. (7, 3)
6 Young state? (4)
10 How the beer may have been carried by the dog? (7)
11 One might hope it to be a flower with directions for insuring silent spring. (3, 4)
12 Establishment, if you want the truth! (14)
14 Sent up by enough 16? (8)
15 Bum steer a prankster might give? (6)
16 Lunge affected by most of the oxidation—or even oxygen, nowadays. (6)
18 Piccadilly and Oxford? They might put on quite a show there! (8)
22 What might happen when you shoot at the floor? (Notice their holdings!) (8, 6)
24 Nautical command, but the man seems to get a "Nyet!" (5, 2)
25 It might be tacked on a splintered tree, tho! (7)
26 See 7 down
27 Little George stops to see some mathematicians of the country. (10)

DOWN:

1 One might judge that mother gets a general idea of the price! (10)
2 Not really the shape of the star in "Twinkle, Twinkle"! (7)
3 See 7 down
4 True and false—for a comedian! (7)
5 Excessively ornate state, should you read an article on it! (6)
7, 8, 26, 23 and 3 Implying shop-lifters get a little assistance from higher authority. (3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 10)
8 See 7 down
9 If you're planning to change any of your habits, you might look into these. (7, 7)
13 Their output might be suspended in 9. (5, 5)
17 Proving there's a bit of a boy in any old rake, whether it comes to music or food! (7)
19 Match set, perhaps, when one did. (7)
20 The ways of the city? (7)
21 Goes to a certain amount of trouble to provide low-type foil. (6)
23 See 7 down

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1180

ACROSS: 1 Astonished; 6 Apse; 10 Caravel; 11 and 29 Warming oven; 12 Harridan; 13 Douai; 15 Pedal; 17 Osteopath; 19 Spinnaker; 21 Knife; 23 Adept; 24 In a pinch; 27 Evinced; 28 Oversee; 30 Waitresses. DOWN: 1 and 26 Archness; 2 and 18 Turn and turn about; 3 Never; 4 Salad fork; 5 Edwin; 7 Primula; 8 Englishmen; 9 Braddock; 14 and 24 A Passage to India; 16 Lunatics; 20 Itemize; 22 Incises; 25 Irene.

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

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